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YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 

TRANSGENDER TROPES & CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
Jennifer L. Levi & Kevin M Barr.Y' 
The Trump administration is aggressively and systematically rolling 
back policies that protect transgender people. History teaches that these 
governmental attacks are notnew, but insteadrepresent the latest salvo in 
a long but losing battle to disparage transgender people, who have been 
ruthlessly depicted as criminals, deviants, and selfish iconoclasts. 
Notwithstanding the current administration's open hostility toward 
transgender people, constitutional protections endure. This Essay 
discusses the evolution ofgovernment discrimination against transgender 
people-from laws that criminalized the violation ofgender norms in the 
late twentieth century to the present-day exclusion oftransgender people 
from the U.S. military-and transgender people's continued efforts to 
secure recognition oftheir rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
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This is an historic moment for transgender rights. After transgender 
people secured protection from healthcare discrimination through a 
federal regulation implementing the Affordable Care Act in 2016, a federal 
district court in Texas enjoined enforcement of portions of the regulation.1 
1. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (defining discrimination "on the basis of sex" to 
include "discrimination on the basis of ... gender identity"), with Trump 
Administration Plan to Roll Back Health Care Nondiscrimination Regulation: 
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The Trump administration appears poised to rescind the regulation by 
issuing a new regulation that defines "sex" in an artificially restrictive way 
that is designed to exclude transgender health concerns.2 After 
transgender students secured express, full inclusion in educational 
programs and facilities through a federal government policy that 
prohibited schools from denying access to gender-appropriate restroom 
facilities, the Trump administration rescinded the policy.3 And after 
transgender service members secured the right to serve openly following 
the toppling of the U.S. military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the Trump 
administration attempted to reinstate a transgender ban on military 
service by issuing a White House memorandum claiming, without factual 
support, that transgender people undermined "military effectiveness and 
lethality."4 
Frequently Asked Questions, NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Apr. 8, 
2019), https://transequality.org/HCRL-FAQ [https://perma.cc/RD82­
DZQK] (discussing court decision (Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. 
Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016)) enjoining enforcement of portions of the 
healthcare antidiscrimination regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 92.4). 
2. 	 NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 1 (discussing the Trump 
administration's plan to roll back portions of the healthcare 
antidiscrimination regulations). 
3. 	 Compare Scott Horsley, White House Sends Schools Guidance on 
Transgender Access to Bathrooms, NPR (May 13, 2016, 5:02 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo­
way/2016/05/13/ 4 77896804/ obama-administration-to-offer-schools­
guidance-on-transgender-bathrooms [https: / /perma.cc/74AP-UF89] 
(discussing 2016 guidance directing schools to permit students to use 
restrooms consistent with their gender identity), with Rebecca Hersher & 
Carrie Johnson, Trump Administration Rescinds Obama Rule On 
Transgender Students' Bathroom Use, NPR (Feb. 22, 2017, 7:37 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/516664633/ 
trump-administration-rescinds-obama-rule-on-transgender-students­
bathroom-use [https://perma.cc/PZ7L-XAEC] (discussing 2017 guidance 
from the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Education 
rescinding 2016 guidance). 
4. 	 Compare Terri Moon Cronk, Transgender Service Members Can Now Serve 
Openly, Carter Announces, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE (June 30, 2016), 
https: / / dod.defense.gov /News/Article/ Article /82 2 2 3 5 /transgender­
service-members-can-now-serve-openly-carter-announces 
[https://perma.cc/E34V-2SAE] (discussing Secretary of Defense Ash 
Carter's announcement that transgender service members could "openly 
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It is not hyperbole to say that transgender rights are under attack; the 
Trump administration is aggressively and systematically rolling back 
policies that protect transgender people. History teaches that these 
governmental attacks are not new, but instead represent the latest salvo in 
a long but losing battle to disparage and diminish transgender people. 
These attacks are fueled by tired tropes about transgender people, who 
are ruthlessly depicted as criminals, deviants, and selfish iconoclasts. 
Notwithstanding the current administration's open hostility toward 
transgender people, constitutional protections endure. Transgender 
people are seeking-and securing-the protection under the law of last 
resort: the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, which, in the words of 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, has served as a bulwark against oppression 
for "people once ignored or excluded."5 
In Part I of this Essay, we begin with a brief discussion of three popular 
tropes that underlie opposition toward transgender people: transgender 
people as criminal, immoral, and disrespectful. In Part II, we describe the 
evolution of government discrimination against transgender people, from 
laws that criminalized the violation of gender norms in the late twentieth 
century to the present-day exclusion of transgender people from federal 
and state civil rights laws, single-sex services, and the U.S. military. We 
also analyze the government's reasons for such discrimination, which 
derive from one or more of the three transgender tropes, and explain why 
these reasons have consistently failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
In Part III, we offer some concluding remarks about the legal, doctrinal, 
theoretical, and symbolic implications of courts' recognition of 
transgender rights under the Constitution. 
serve their country without fear of retribution"), with Doe 2 v. Mattis, 344 F. 
Supp. 3d 16, 23 (D.D.C. 2018) (stating that the Trump administration's "ban 
on military service by transgender individuals likely violates Plaintiffs' Fifth 
Amendment rights based on a number of factors, 'including the sheer 
breadth of the exclusion ... , the unusual circumstances surrounding the 
President's announcement of [the exclusion], the fact that the reasons given 
for [the exclusion] do not appear to be supported by any facts, and the recent 
rejection of those reasons by the military itself."') (quoting Doe 1 v. Trump, 
275 F. Supp. 3d 167,176 (D.D.C. 2017)); accordDoe 2 v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 
3d 474, 493 (D.D.C. 2018). 
5. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996). 
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I. TRANSGENDER TROPES 
Three tropes fuel discrimination against transgender people: 
criminality, immorality, and disrespect. 
The first trope is that transgender people are dangerous; they are 
criminals who threaten public safety. This view is predicated on myths, 
fears, and stereotypes about transgender people, who are seen as 
imposters trying to obtain an advantage through deception, or sexual 
predators trying to harm vulnerable people.6 For those who subscribe to 
this view, transgender people are not to be trusted; their self-expression is 
fraudulent or worse, criminal. Accordingly, the role of law is to deter the 
expression and punish those who engage in it. 
The second trope is that transgender people are immoral; they are 
deviants who threaten the moral health of the community. This view is 
predicated on animus toward transgender people, who are seen as neither 
male nor female, but rather something in between-something less than 
human.7 This view often derives from religious conceptions of what is 
6. 	 See Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and the Asian 
American Legal Defense and Education Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 7, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., No. 16-273 (U.S. Mar. 2, 
2017) [hereinafter NAACP Amicus Br.] (stating that "unfounded fears of 
sexual predation"-against transgender people and African-Americans­
"have often been used to justify discrimination"); see also SUSAN STRYKER, 
TRANSGENDER HISTORY, THE ROOTS OF TooAv'S REVOLUTION 132-35, 227, 230 (2d 
ed. 2017) (discussing the '"transsexual rapist' trope [that] began to circulate 
in grassroots lesbian networks" in the 1970's and persists among some 
feminists, "ex-gay ministries, religious fundamentalists, antiabortion 
activists, and bigots of many stripes"); Mark Joseph Stern, The NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund's Transgender Rights Brief is a Trenchant History Lesson, 
SLATE· (Mar. 3, 2017, 4:07 PM), https://slate.comjhuman­
interest/2017/03 /naacp-ldfs-trans-rights-brief-is-a-trenchant-history­
lesson.html [https://perma.cc/6BLS-VA4U]; infra Part II (discussing 
discriminatory laws and policies that derive from tropes about transgender 
people being threatening). 
7. 	 See Plaintiff Jane Doe's Corrected Motion for Reconsideration of Order on 
Defendants' Motion for Clarification at 4, Doe v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., No. 17­
12255-RGS (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2018), ECF No. 66 [hereinafter Pl.'s Mot. for 
Recon.] (stating that "one of the most pernicious stereotypes about 
transgender people [is that they are] ... neither male nor female"-they are 
"less than human[,] ... an objectified 'it' rather than a person"); see also 
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sinful, or pseudo-scientific conceptions of what is "natural."8 For those 
who subscribe to this view, transgender people engender discomfort, 
disgust, and disdain.9 The role of the law, therefore, is to discourage the 
behavior for the sake of the community. 
The third trope is that transgender people are iconoclasts; they are 
irreverent agitators who undermine community norms-particularly 
those relating to personal privacy.10 Those who subscribe to this view do 
not want transgender people to upend settled expectations regarding 
seeing or being seen by someone perceived to be of a different sex­
regardless of the resultant exclusion that those expectations impose on 
transgender people. Transgender people should not be fully integrated 
into the fabric of everyday life, the argument goes; they should stay in their 
lane, and the object of law should be to keep them there. 
None of these tropes are accurate. Transgender people are not sexual 
predators; there is no evidence that transgender people pose more of a 
STRYKER, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing perception of transgender people as 
"not-quite-human," and as "monstrous and frightening"). 
8. 	 See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing biblical and 
pseudo-scientific defenses for transgender discrimination); see also STRYKER, 
supra note 6, at 26-27 (discussing disparagement of transgender people for 
defying expectation grounded in "scientific, cultural, or religious beliefs 
about what is natural, normal, or divinely given"). 
9. 	 See, e.g., NAACP Amicus Br., supra note 6, at 7 (comparing "discomfort, fear, 
and hostility toward transgender students because of their gender identity" 
with justifications for racial segregation); see also infra Part II (discussing 
discriminatory laws and policies that derive from tropes about transgender 
people being immoral); ct MARTHA c. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO i'IUMANITY xiv 
(2010) (discussing "large segments of the Christian Right [that] openly 
practice a politics based upon disgust," depicting "the sexual practices of 
lesbians and, especially, of gay men as vile and revolting [and] ... 
suggest[ing] that such practices contaminate and defile society, producing 
decay and degeneration"). 
10. 	 See, e.g., NAACP Amicus Br., supra note 6, at 15 (comparing school officials' 
claims that transgender students would "violate the privacy of other 
students" with similar claims regarding racial desegregation); see also infra 
Part II (discussing discriminatory laws and policies that derive from tropes 
about transgender people violating others' privacy). 
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"danger" than any other group.11 Although moral animus toward 
transgender people has existed in some quarters for quite some time, 
history teaches that respect for transgender people is a tradition far more 
deeply rooted, with "individuals whom today we might call 
transgenderO ... play[ing] prominent roles in many societies, including 
our own[,] ... [f]rom prehistoric times to the present."12 And transgender 
people do not seek to violate others' privacy; they seek merely to affirm 
and secure their own. 
One might suggest a fourth trope: transgender people as mentally ill. 
Although this is certainly a common misconception about transgender 
people, it is not meaningfully distinct from-but instead interacts with­
the three above-described tropes. Stated another way, one might believe 
that transgender people are criminal, immoral, or disrespectful for any 
number of reasons, including that they have a mental health condition. 
Such a view reflects not only stereotypes about transgender people but 
also stereotypes about people with mental health conditions more broadly, 
namely, that they are necessarily violent (e.g., people with bipolar disorder 
are often perceived as being prone to violence), they are morally deficient 
(e.g., people with cognitive limitations were once forcibly sterilized "to 
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind,") 13 and 
they are disrespectful of norms (e.g., people with mental health conditions 
that require accommodations are often perceived as unfairly draining 
resources from those without such conditions). 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
Transgender people experience discrimination in a broad range of 
contexts across the private and public sectors.14 Because the focus of this 
11. 	 See Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom 
Equality, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 161 (2010); infra note 84 and 
accompanying text. 
12. 	 Dallas Denny, Transgender Communities of the United States in the Late 
Twentieth Century, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 171 (Paisley Currah et al., eds. 
2006); see also STRYKER, supra note 6, at 40 (locating reverence for 
transgender people in various religious and spiritual traditions, including 
shamanic practices, ancient rabbinical texts, and the Qur'an). 
13. 	 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
14. 	 NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. 
TRANSGENDER SURVEY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (Dec. 2016), 
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Essay is on constitutional protections for transgender people, we focus on 
the latter, that is, discrimination by the government, namely, the 
legislature and the executive. This Part discusses government 
discrimination in four contexts: criminalization of gender nonconformity, 
denial of access to appropriate single-sex services, and exclusion from civil 
rights laws and service in the U.S. military. Although the context for such 
discrimination varies, the justifications are nearly identical; all derive from 
at least one of the three transgender tropes discussed above, and each has, 
by and large, failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
A. Criminalization 
From the mid-nineteenth century through the late twentieth century, 
states and localities broadly prohibited transgender people from 
participating in public life by criminalizing the violation of gender norms.15 
City ordinances did so explicitly-prohibiting one from "dress[ing] with 
the designed intent to disguise his or her true sex as that of the opposite 
sex."16 State laws, by contrast, prohibited "disguise" more generally.17 
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Executive­
Summary-Decl7.pdf [https://perma.cc/459J-EBPP] (discussing 
discrimination against transgender people with respect to the "most basic 
elements of life, such as finding a job, having a place to live, accessing 
medical care, and enjoying the support of family and community"). 
15. 	 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 106-07 
(2018); see also Levi & Redman, supra note 11, at 152 ("Twenty-eight cities 
passed cross-dressing laws in the nineteenth century and an additional 
twelve passed laws in the twentieth century, with the most recent passed by 
Cincinnati in 1974."). Much of the previous scholarship-including the 
authors'-refers to these laws as "cross-dressing" laws. This Essay 
substitutes the term "gender-norming" in order to emphasize the illegitimate 
purpose behind these laws, rather than the arbitrary means used to 
effectuate that purpose. 
16. 	 Doe I v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (quoting City of 
Houston's ordinance banning the violation of gender norms). These 
ordinances also targeted non-transgender feminist women in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whose desire to wear more 
comfortable and less restrictive women's clothing was deemed "tantamount 
to cross-dressing"-with women seeking "to 'pass' as men." Levi & Redman, 
supra note 11, at 153. 
17. 	 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 15, at 107. 
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Although the original intent behind at least some of these state laws was 
the deterrence of criminality by non-transgender people-such as the 
armed insurrectionists of the Hudson Valley who dressed in ornate 
sheepskin masks and women's calico dresses to disguise their identities 
during the anti-rent movement of the mid-1800s-by the mid-twentieth 
century, these laws were used to threaten and punish transgender people 
for expressing their gender identity in public.18 Whether by intent or 
application, these laws often rendered transgender people invisible by 
forbidding them from participating in public life. 
1. Justifications for Gender-Norming Laws 
Transgender people arrested or at risk of arrest challenged these laws 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, they argued that the laws 
were void for vagueness and also violated both equal protection and 
substantive due process. Defenders· of the laws offered two primary 
justifications-public safety and morality-derived from tropes about 
transgender people as inherently threatening and morally depraved. 
Gender-norming laws furthered public safety, they argued, by 
"protect[ing] citizens from being misled or defrauded" and also by 
deterring criminal conduct-"aid[ing] in the description and detection of 
criminals" and "prevent[ing] crimes in washrooms."19 According to this 
reasoning, people-whether transgender or not-who dress in clothing 
inconsistent with their birth-assigned sex are misleading the public for 
nefarious and often criminal purposes, such as perpetrating assault in a 
single-sex facility or escaping responsibility for a crime.20 
18. 	 See id; see also Levi & Redman, supra note 11, at 152 (discussing routine 
enforcement of gender-norming laws in 1970's and 1980's "to punish people 
for their gender expression"). 
19. 	 City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524 (Ill. 1978); see also McConn, 
489 F. Supp. at 80 (quoting City of Chicago, 389 N.E.2d at 524); City of 
Chicago v. Wilson, 357 N.E.2d 1337, 1341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), rev'd, 389 
N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1978) ("Allowing a disguising of the sexes would hinder the 
detection of crime, would render uncertain the traditional separation of the 
sexes in public facilities, and would allow males to more easily victimize 
females, particularly in public ladies' facilities where vulnerability to attack 
is already too great."). · 
20. 	 See City of Columbus v. Zanders, 266 N.E.2d 602, 604, 606 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 
1970) (stating that "common sense and experience discloses that this 
ordinance has a real and substantial relation to the public safety and general 
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Gender-norming laws also furthered "the public morals," defenders 
argued, by "prevent[ing] inherently antisocial conduct which is contrary to 
the accepted norms of our society."21 Unlike the public safety rationale, 
this second justification was explicitly directed at transgender people. 
Transgender people who dressed in clothing inconsistent with their birth­
assigned sex were acting immorally, the argument went, for a number of 
reasons. 
First, such conduct was said to violate gender norms rooted in 
religious tradition. · As one court noted, according to the Book of 
Deuteronomy, "[t]he woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a 
man, neither shall a man put on a woman's garment: for all that do so are 
abomination unto the Lord, thy God."22 The same court offered a second 
moral defense for gender-norming laws, suggesting that the violation of 
gender norms was at odds with biology because it "frustrat[ es] the 
reproductive urge" by making it more difficult for "the male and female of 
the species to recognize each other's differences."23 Third and relatedly, 
defenders of gender-norming criminal laws argued that "dressing or 
disguising as a member of the opposite sex [wa]s a step toward creating 
homosexual relationships," which were, themselves, immoral (and, prior 
to Lawrence v. Texas, effectively illegal in many states) because they were 
inconsistent with procreation and, therefore, with "the survival of the 
race."24 Fourth, such conduct was said to offend the general public's 
welfare. There are numerous subjects who would want to change their sex 
identity in order to perpetrate crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, assault, 
etc.," but holding ordinance unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff). 
21. 	 City ofChicago, 389 N.E.2d at 524-25. 
22. 	 People v. Simmons, 357 N.Y.S.Zd 362, 365 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1974). 
23. 	 Id 
24. 	 See People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834, 838 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 1968) 
(Markowitz, J., dissenting) (stating that it was "within the province of 
legislative controls" to discourage "overt homosexuality in public places 
which is offensive to public morality"); City ofChicago, 357 N.E.2d at 1341 
("If a state may prohibit homosexual activity between consenting adults in 
private, it is clear that it may also prohibit the offensive display of 
homosexual conduct in public. In the instant case the Chicago City Council 
apparently believed the appearance in public of members of one sex 
pretending to be members of the opposite sex would have a detrimental 
effect on the morals of the community."). As the City of Houston argued in 
support of its gender-norming law, "dressing or disguising as a member of 
the opposite sex is a step toward creating homosexual relationships" and, 
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"aesthetic preference[s)"; like state "ugly laws" that prohibited "unsightly" 
people (including many people with disabilities) from appearing in public, 
gender-norming laws prohibited transgender people from affronting the 
public's sensibilities.25 Lastly, defenders argued that transgender people 
who dress in clothing inconsistent with their birth-assigned sex incite 
others to engage in immoral, or even criminal, behavior: for example, an 
"ineffective [cross-gender] disguise may engender cat-calls and slurring 
remarks leading to a breach of the peace," while an "efficient disguise 
could lead to trouble after an acquaintance is formed with the disguise and 
the true sex is disclosed when the friendship becomes amorous." 26 
2. Constitutional Review of Gender-Norming Laws 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, courts, by and large, rejected cities' 
public safety and morality arguments and held that the gender-norming 
criminal laws violated Fourteenth Amendment due process under two 
distinct theories.27 
therefore, it can be "proscribed in the same manner as more overt 
homosexual conduct" The City argued: 
Society is presently thought to have an interest in barring homosexual 
acts since homosexuality is, at least partially, an acquired or taught trait. 
Our society deems it important not to have its youth learning to be 
homosexual rather than heterosexual. This interest is in part rooted in 
the survival of the race; procreation is necessary to ensure the 
continuation of the human race. 
Levi & Redman, supra note 11, at 157-58 (quoting Respondent's Brief in 
Opposition at 3, Mayes v. Texas, No. 73-627, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) 
[hereinafter Texas Brief in Opposition]). 
25. 	 Oty ofChicago, 389 N.E.2d at 525; see Note, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035 n.2 
(1987) (stating that "[u]ntil recently, a number of major American cities had 
so-called 'ugly laws,' generally part of their vagrancy laws, which imposed 
fines on 'unsightly' people who were seen.in public places," and quoting the 
City of Chicago's ordinance, which was repealed in 1974, that imposed fines 
on people who appeared in public and were "diseased, maimed, mutilated or 
in any way deformed so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object"). 
26. 	 Levi & Redman, supra note 11, at 155 (quoting Texas Brief in Opposition, 
supra note 24, at 4). 
27. 	 See I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 1, 10 (2008). 
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Many courts struck down the gender-norming laws because they were 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process.28 In CHy ofColumbus 
v. Rogers, for example, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that a local 
ordinance's reference to "'dress not belonging to his or her sex,' when 
considered in the light of contemporary dress habits, make[s the 
ordinance] 'so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."'29 In CityofCindnnati 
v. Adams, an Ohio trial court likewise concluded that the sheer breadth of a 
similarly-phrased law was unconstitutionally vague because it 
"encourages arbitrary and capricious enforcement of the law. It provides a 
convenient instrument for harsh and discriminatory enforcement by 
prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their 
displeasure."30 
Other courts relied on substantive due process to invalidate gender­
norming laws. Gender-norming laws infringed on transgender people's 
liberty-specifically, "values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and 
personal integrity that ... the Constitution was designed to protect"-for 
no rational reason. 31 In City ofChkago v. Wilson, for instance, the Supreme 
Court of Illinois, applying rational basis, held that the City of Chicago's 
gender-norming ban infringed the plaintiffs' liberty in violation of 
28. 	 The Supreme Court has held that a law is unconstitutionally vague in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment if it: fails to give a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden 
by the statute; encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions; 
makes criminal activities that by modern standards are normally innocent; 
or places almost unfettered discretion in the hands of the police. 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-63, 168 (1972); see 
also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("It is a basic 
principle ·of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined."). 
29. 	 City of Columbus v. Rogers, 324 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ohio 1975) (quoting 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)); see also D.C. v. City of St. 
Louis, 795 F.2d 652, 655 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that "[cross-dressing] 
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague insofar as it attempts to proscribe 
conduct by use of the words 'indecent or lewd act of behavior"'). 
30. 	 City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974) 
(quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940)). 
31. 	 City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524 (Ill. 1978) (quoting Kelley v. 
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
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substantive due process. 32 According to the court, the law did not "curb 
criminal activity" because the plaintiffs, who were "cross-dressing ... as a 
part of a sex-reassignment preoperative therapy program," were not 
engaged in criminal activity, and, "[a]bsent evidence to the contrary," the 
court refused to assume that they were somehow "prone to commit 
crimes."33 Furthermore, the law did not "protect[] the public morals"; 
there was no evidence "that cross-dressing, when done as a part of a 
preoperative therapy program or otherwise, is, in and of itself, harmful to 
society"-regardless of whether it offends "the general public's aesthetic 
preferences."34 
In Doe v. McConn, the Southern District of Texas, applying the most 
"minimal degree of scrutiny," similarly struck down the City of Houston's 
gender-norming ban on substantive due process grounds.35 According to 
the court, the City's purported reasons for the gender-norming ban-i.e., 
"the public's desire and the police department's need to know someone's 
true sexual identity"-did not justify infringing the plaintiffs' "well-being," 
and the court could not conceive of any reason that would justify such an 
infringement.36 In Mcconn, as in City ofChicago, the court recognized that 
for transgender as well as non-transgender people, one's "choice of 
appearance" is a core aspect of one's identity protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment37 Intrusions into one's "choice to be as he is" cannot be 
justified by the offense of others.38 
32. 	 Id at 525. 
33. 	 Id at 524-25. 
34. 	 Id at 525. In holding the City's gender-norming law unconstitutional in 
violation of substantive due process, the Supreme Court of Illinois explicitly 
declined to reach the appellate court's determination that the City's gender­
norming law did not violate equal protection based on sex because it served 
the "legitimate interest" of "maintaining the integrity of the sexes." See id at 
523, rev'g City of Chicago v. Wilson, 357 N.E.2d 1337, 1342 (Ill. App. Ct 
1976). 
35. 	 489 F. Supp. at 81. 
36. 	 Id at 80. 
37. 	 Id at 78 (stating that a transgender person "has not made a choice to be as 
he is, but rather that ... choice has been made for him through many causes 
preceding and beyond his control"). 
38. 	 Id; see also id at 80 ("In this case, the aesthetic preference of society must 
be balanced against the individual's well-being."). 
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B. DenialofAccess to Appropriate Single-Sex Services 
Although governments no longer criminalize transgender people's 
public appearance through enforcement of gender-norming laws, 
governments continue to deny transgender people access to a broad range 
of appropriate single-sex public services by ignoring the legitimacy of 
transgender people's identity after they go through gender transition.39 
For example, public school policies and practices regularly require 
transgender students to use restrooms or comply with appearance norms 
associated with their assigned birth sex;40 public employment policies 
similarly deny transgender public employees access to appropriate 
restrooms, uniforms, and nametags consistent with their gender identity;41 
prison policies incarcerate transgender inmates in prisons inconsistent 
with their gender identity, subjecting them to unsafe conditions and 
excluding them from various educational programs;42 state laws require 
proof of gender confirmation surgery in order to amend the sex 
designation on one's birth certificate, or prohibit such amendments 
altogether;43 and state laws prohibit transgender people from using 
restrooms consistent with their gender identity in a wide range of public 
settings, including libraries, parks, airports, state hospitals, police 
departments, and courthouses.44 
. 39. 	 See, e.g., 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 14, at 10-11, 14-15 
(documenting denial of access to single-sex restrooms in employment and 
other settings). 
40. 	 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034, 1040 (7th Cir. 2017) (denial of access to appropriate restroom); Doe 
v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1-2 (denial of appropriate uniform). 
41. 	 See, e.g., Comp!. iTiT 17-19, 28-32, No. 14-4822, Blatt v. Cabela's Retail, Inc. 
(Nov. 5, 2014). 
42. 	 See, e.g., Doe v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., No. 17-122555-RGS, 2018 WL 2994403, 
at *3-4 (D. Mass. 2018). 
43. 	 See, e.g., Am. Comp!. iT 41, No. 3:16-cv-08640-MAS-DEA, Doe v. Arrisi (D.N.j. 
Sept. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Doe v. Arrisi Am. Comp!.]; see also TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 68-3-203(d) ("The sex of an individual shall not be changed on the 
original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery."). 
44. 	 See Carcano v. Cooper, 2018 WL 4717897, at *3 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (discussing 
North Carolina law, which, among others things, "provided that all public 
agencies, including local boards of public education, must 'require' that 
'every multiple occupancy bathroom or changing facility ... be designated 
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Antidiscrimination statutes figure prominently in this context. Many 
transgender people over the past two decades have successfully 
challenged government discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which prohibits sex discrimination in public (and private) 
employment,45 and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act, which 
prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded education.46 In addition to 
bringing Title VII and Title IX claims, or where these antidiscrimination 
statutes do not apply (as in the case of discriminatory prison policies and 
for and only used by persons based on their biological sex,' defined as the 
'physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person's 
birth certificate."') (quoting North Carolina's Public Facilities Privacy & 
Security Act, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, commonly known as House Bill 2). 
45. 	 See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 571, 
575 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that discrimination against transgender 
employee violated Title VII because it was based on "the failure to conform 
to sex stereotypes" and, more straightforwardly, "on the basis of sex"­
namely, changing one's sex); WhHaker, 858 F.3d at 1049 (holding that 
transgender discrimination was sex stereotyping under Title IX); Glenn, 663 
F.3d at 1317-18 & n.5, 1321 (holding that employer's discrimination against 
transgender employee was sex stereotyping under Title VII); Smith v. City of 
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); accord Schwenk v. 
Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (Gender Motivated 
Violence Act); Rosa v. Park W. Bank Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 
2000) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. 
Supp. 3d 509, 525, 527 (D. Conn. 2016) (holding that discrimination against 
transgender applicant violated Title VII because the discrimination was "on 
the basis of gender stereotypes" as well as "on the basis of sex"-namely, 
"factors that are sufficiently 'related to sex or [that] ha[ve] something to do 
with sex"') (citations omitted); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 
305-06 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that discrimination against transgender 
employee violated Title VII because the discrimination was based on "sex 
stereotyping" as well "based on sex"-namely, based on gender identity 
which "is a component of sex"); Examples of Court Decisions Supporting 
Coverage of LGBT-Related Discrimination Under Title Vil, EEOC, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/lgbt_examples_decisions.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/H2GH-D4SM] (compiling federal court decisions over the 
past two decades holding that discrimination against transgender employees 
is sex-based discrimination in violation of Title VII). 
46. 	 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034, 1048-50 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that discrimination against 
transgender student was sex stereotyping in violation of Title IX); accord. 
Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 868 (S.D. Ohio 2016). 
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birth certificate laws), transgender litigants have challenged government 
exclusion under a number of constitutional theories.47 
As with legal challenges to laws that criminalized the violation of 
gender norms, transgender litigants have argued that the denial of 
appropriate single-sex services infringes their liberty in violation of 
substantive due process. Specifically, laws and policies that tie transgender 
people without exception to standards associated with their birth­
assigned sex infringe: (i) their fundamental right to privacy by forcing 
them to disclose sensitive, personal information about themselves-Le., 
that they are transgender-thereby exposing them to discrimination and 
bodily harm;48 (ii) their fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment by forcing them to undergo unnecessary and inappropriate 
medical procedures;49 and (iii) their fundamental right to "define and 
47. 	 See infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional 
challenges to government discrimination against transgender people). 
48. 	 See Doe v. Massachusetts Dep't of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *11 (D. Mass. 
2018) (holding that transgender woman incarcerated in men's prison stated 
claim that the State had deprived her of liberty interest in violation of 
substantive due process based, in part, on her "fears for her physical safety, 
the potential for sexual violence and assault, the trauma and stigmatization 
instilled by undergoing regular strip-searches by male guards and, on 
occasion, being forced to shower in the presence of male inmates"); Compl. if 
121, 170, No. 1:16-cv-00236, Carcano v. McCrory (M.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2016) 
[hereinafter McCrory Compl.) (alleging that North Carolina law violated 
substantive due process "by require[ing] the disclosure of highly personal 
information regarding transgender people to each person who sees them 
using a restroom or other facility inconsistent with their gender identity or 
gender expression. This disclosure places them at risk of bodily harm" ­
namely, "harassment and potential violence by others"); see also Scott 
Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 Nw. U. L. REV. 159, 192-93 (2015) 
("[T]ransgender people are... outed when governments,· schools, or 
employers refuse to let them use a bathroom consistent with their gender 
expression, and force them to use bathrooms that align with the sex assigned 
at birth or segregate them in unisex restrooms."). 
49. 	 See Am. Compl. if 99, No. 3:16-cv-08640-MAS-DEA, Doe v. Arrisi (D.N.J. Sept 
22, 2017) [hereinafter Doe v. Arrisi Am. Compl.) (alleging that (now 
repealed) New Jersey law requiring proof of gender confirmation surgery to 
amend birth certificate "depriv[ed plaintiff] of her fundamental rights, 
including to refuse unwanted surgery" in violation of substantive due 
process); McCrory Compl., supra note 48, at if 175 (alleging that North 
Carolina law "forces transgender people to undergo medical procedures that 
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express their identity" on equal terms with non-transgender people.50 
Because these rights are fundamental, transgender litigants argue, 
heightened scrutiny applies to their infringement.51 Accordingly, laws and 
government policies that deny appropriate single-sex services are 
may not be medically appropriate or available in order to access facilities 
consistent with their gender identity"); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (invalidating state law that permitted involuntary 
sterilization of people convicted of crimes of moral turpitude). 
50. 	 See Doe v. Arrisi Am. Compl., supra note 49, at ifif 82, 99 (alleging that (now 
repealed) New Jersey law requiring proof of gender confirmation surgery to 
amend birth certificate "depriv[ed plaintiff] of her fundamental rights, 
including. . . the right to personal autonomy" and "the right to gender 
autonomy," that is, "the right to express her gender as she sees fit"); see also 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct 2584, 2593 (2015) ("The Constitution 
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific 
rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their 
identity."); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of 
existence .... Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."); Jillian Todd 
Weiss, Protecting Transgender Students: Application of Title IX to Gender 
Identity or Expression and the Constitutional Right to Gender Autonomy. 28 
Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'v 331, 339-40 (2013) (arguing "that there is a right to 
'gender autonomy,' that protects people with transgender and transsexual 
identity, as well as those of traditional gender identity, from restrictions 
based on gender identity. This right to 'gender autonomy' is the right of self­
determination of one's gender, free from state control, and the right to self­
identify as that gender, free from state contradiction."). 
51. 	 CompareCompl. if 84, No. 1:17-cv-12255-RGS, Doe v. Mass. Dep't of Corr. (D. 
Mass. Nov. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Doe v. Mass. Compl.] ("Defendants' 
treatment of Jane Doe ... impermissibly burdens Jane Doe's fundamental 
rights to autonomy and privacy, including her right to live as a woman and 
consistent wi~h her female gender identity. By disregarding Jane Doe's status 
as a woman and by disregarding her female gender identity as set forth 
above, Defendants have violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."), with Mass. Dep't of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *11 (D. Mass. 
2018) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs substantive due 
process claim); see also McCrory Compl. ifif 171, 179 ("There is no 
compelling state interest that is furthered by [North Carolina law denying 
appropriate single-sex services to transgender people], nor is [North 
Carolina law] narrowly tailored or the least restrictive alternative for 
promoting a state interest"). 
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unconstitutional because they are not narrowly tailored or substantially 
related to a compelling or important purpose.sz Alternatively, even if the 
rights infringed upon are not considered fundamental, transgender 
litigants argue that the denial of appropriate single-sex services is not 
rationally related to any legitimate government purpose.s3 
Transgender litigants further argue that the denial of appropriate 
single-sex services violates equal protection in several ways. First, laws 
and policies that rest exclusively on a person's birth-assigned sex single 
out transgender people for different treatment because only transgender 
people have a sex that is different than that assigned to them at birth.s4 
Discrimination on the basis of transgender status constitutes a 
suspect/quasi-suspect classification under the U.S. Supreme Court's four­
factor test and is therefore subject to heightened scrutiny.ss Specifically, 
52. 	 See, e.g., McCrory Comp!. 'lf'lf 171, 179 (invoking heightened scrutiny). 
53. 	 See Doe v. Mass. Comp!., supra note 51, at 'If 84 (alleging that "Defendants' 
placement of Jane Doe in a men's correctional facility and disregard of the 
fact that she is a woman and has a female gender identity is irrational" in 
violation of substantive due process); see also McCrory Comp!. 'lf'lf 171, 179 
("[North Carolina law denying appropriate single-sex services to 
transgender people] is not even rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest."). 
54. 	 See, e.g., Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(stating that transgender man who was separated from other male detainees 
and handcuffed to a wall without food "adequately alleged that he 
was treated differently than others similarly situated as a result of 
intentional or purposeful discrimination" in violation of Equal Protection 
Clause). 
55. 	 See, e.g., Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. 
Pa. 2017) (concluding that "all of the indicia for the application of the 
heightened intermediate scrutiny standard are present" for transgender 
individuals, and applying "an intermediate standard of Equal Protection 
review" to a school policy that prohibited students from using restroom 
consistent with their gender identity); accord Bd. of Educ. of the Highland 
Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 
2016) (applying "heightened scrutiny" to transgender plaintiffs equal 
protection claim based on "four-factor test to determine suspect and quasi­
suspect classifications"); Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139-40 (applying 
"intermediate scrutiny" because "transgender people are a quasi-suspect 
class"); cf. Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 524 n.8. (D. 
Conn. 2016) (citing Adldns for proposition that "transgender people are a 
'quasi-suspect' class and therefore ... disparate treatment alleged to violate 
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transgender people have suffered a history of discrimination; transgender 
status does not affect a person's ability to participate in society; being 
transgender is a core aspect of a person's identity, unchangeable, and 
impervious to external influences; and transgender people are a minority 
lacking political power.56 
Second, laws and policies that are linked exclusively to a person's 
birth-assigned sex trigger heightened scrutiny because they are, quite 
literally, sex-based classifications; they deny services to transgender 
people based oA sex-related physiological characteristics, whether real or 
perceived.57 In addition, these laws and policies reflect sex-stereotypes­
i.e., the stereotype that no one ever lives in a sex different than that 
assigned to them at birth.58 
the Equal Protection Clause is subject to the elevated 'intermediate scrutiny' 
standard"). 
56. 	 See, e.g., Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (stating that, "[u]pon consideration 
of the[ four] factors" used by the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether a 
new classification qualifies as a quasi-suspect class, "the Court 
concludes that transgender people are a quasi-suspect class. Accordingly, the 
Court must apply intermediate scrutiny to defendants' treatment of 
plaintiff.") (citing Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012), 
affd, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)); accord. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 
F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (applying four factors); Bd. of Educ. of 
the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 
(S.D. Ohio 2016) (same). 
57. 	 See, e.g., Doe v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *9 (holding that 
housing transgender inmates in facilities that correspond to their birth sex 
was discrimination "based on sex and is therefore subject to heightened 
judicial scrutiny above the normal 'rational basis' test"). 
58. 	 See, e.g., Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051 (holding that school district's restroom 
policy that discriminated against transgender students was "inherently 
based upon" sex stereotyping under Equal Protection Clause); Glenn v. 
Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317-18 & n.5, 1321 (stating that "sex 
discrimination includes discrimination against transgender persons because 
of their failure to comply with stereotypical gender norms," and holding that 
an employer's termination of a transgender employee violated equal 
protection); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that transgender employee's claims of gender discrimination 
"easily constitute" sex stereotyping under Equal Protection Clause); Evancho 
v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist, 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288-89 (W.D. Pa. 2017) 
(holding that discrimination against transgender student was sex 
stereotyping under Equal Protection Clause); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland 
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Lastly, even if heightened scrutiny does not apply, transgender 
litigants argue that such laws and policies violate equal protection under 
any level of review because they are rooted in moral animus against 
transgender people.59 As the Supreme Court has reiterated on numerous 
occasions, "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a Jegjdmate governmental interest"60 "[M]ere negative 
Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 872 (S.D. Ohio 
2016) (same); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (holding that "discrimination against transgender individuals" was 
sex stereotyping "subject to intermediate scrutiny" under the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
Numerous circuit and district courts have similarly held that discrimination 
against transgender people is sex-stereotyping in violation of sex 
discrimination statutes. See supra notes 45-46 (collecting statutory sex 
discrimination cases). These statutory sex discrimination cases are 
significant because they inform the equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Glenn, 
663 F.3d at 1316-18 (relying on Title VII case law in holding that 
discrimination against transgender employee was sex discrimination in 
violation of Equal Protection Clause); accordSmith, 378 F.3d at 577; see also 
Christine Michelle Duffy, Federal Equal Protection, in Gender Identity and 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace: A Practical Guide 15-5 
(Christine Michelle Duffy ed., 2014) ("Constitutional discrimination claims 
by LGBT employees often rely significantly on case law interpreting federal 
statutes that prohibit sex discrimination, including Title VII."). 
59. 	 See, e.g., McCrory Comp!. if 143 (stating that North Carolina law that denied 
transgender people access to appropriate single-sex services discrimination 
"is not substantially related to any important government interest. Indeed, it 
is not even rationally related to any legitimate government interest."). 
60. 	 U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); accord United States 
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (invalidating Section 3 of DOMA, 
which excluded same-sex marriages from the definition of"marriage" under 
federal law because the "essence" of the law was "the interference with the 
equal dignity of same-sex marriages"); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 
(1996) (invalidating a state constitutional amendment that prohibited all 
existing and future antidiscrimination laws protecting lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual people because the "sheer breadth" of the law was "inexplicable by 
anything but animus toward the class that it affects"); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448, 450 (1985) (invalidating a local 
zoning ordinance that required a special use permit for group homes 
housing people with intellectual disabilities based on "irrational 
prejudice"-including "the negative attitude of the majority of property 
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attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly 
cognizable ... , are not permissible bases for [disparate treatment].''61 This 
remains true regardless of whether such discrimination is pursuant to the 
will of the electorate. The government "may not avoid the strictures of [the 
Equal Protection Clause] by deferring to the wishes or objections of some 
fraction of the body politic. 'Private biases may be outside the reach of the 
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.'"62 
1. Justifications for Denial of Appropriate Single-Sex Services 
There are three primary reasons offered for laws and policies that 
deny appropriate single-sex services to transgender people. Two of these 
reasons echo earlier justifications for gender-norming laws: public safety 
and morality.63 The third reason-privacy-looms largest in debates over 
single-sex services. 
First consider public safety. Prohibiting transgender people from 
accessing appropriate single-sex restrooms consistent with their gender 
identity, some argue, protects non-transgender people from sexual 
predators, namely, transgender people who are perceived to be sexually 
threatening, and non-transgender people who "pretend" to be another sex 
in order "to gain access to vulnerable women and children in public 
restrooms."64 In G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board., for example, 
· school officials enacted a policy prohibiting a transgender boy from using 
the boy's restroom at school based, in part, on "safety concerns that could 
arise from sexual responses prompted by students' exposure to the private 
body parts of students of the other biological sex" and fears of "sexual 
assault in restrooms. One commenter suggested that if the proposed policy 
owners" and "[unsubstantiated] fears of elderly residents of the 
neighborhood"-against people with intellectual disabilities). 
61. 	 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; see also id. ("The State may not rely on a 
classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to 
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational."). 
62. 	 Id. at 448-49 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). 
63. 	 See supra Part II.A (discussing laws criminalizing the violation of gender 
norms). 
64. 	 Levi & Redman, supra note 11, at 142. 
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were not adopted, non-transgender boys would come to school wearing 
dresses in order to gain access to the girls' restrooms."65 
North Carolina officials advanced the same safety concerns in defense 
of HB 2, a law that denied appropriate single-sex public services to 
transgender people statewide, as did the State of Massachusetts in support 
of incarcerating a transgender woman in a men's prison.66 
Conversely, and paternalistically, these prohibitions are also said to 
protecttransgender people from the criminal actions of non-transgender 
people who might act violently out of panic and ignorance-for example, a 
non-transgender man's assault of a transgender man upon discovering 
that the latter is transgender.67 In Adkins v. City ofNew York, for example, 
the State of New York defended its police department's treatment of a 
transgender man, who was separated from other male detainees and 
handcuffed to a wall without food, based on officers' concern that other 
men "posed a risk to [his] safety."68 Significantly, those who advance this 
argument ignore the very real safety risks to transgender people who are 
65. 	 G.G. ex rel Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716 (4th Cir. 
2016); see also Evancho, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 278 ("[A] (if not the) prevailing 
concern raised by both those who spoke in favor of Resolution 2 and Board 
proponents alike was that a student would in essence masquerade as being 
transgender, and would then use a designated student restroom inconsistent 
with their assigned sex."). 
66. 	 Compare Doe v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *10 (D. Mass. 
2018) (discussing prison officials' invocation of "generalized concerns for 
prison security" in "hous[ing] inmates according to their biological sex"), 
with Carcano v. Cooper, 2018 WL 4717897, at *2 (M.D.N.C. 2018) 
(discussing "possible danger from deviant actions by individuals taking 
improper advantage of' ordinance permitting transgender people to use 
restrooms consistent with their gender identity"), McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 
at 652 ("As for safety, Defendants argue that separating facility users by 
biological sex serves prophylactically to avoid the opportunity for sexual 
predators to prey on persons in vulnerable places."), and Carcano Comp!. if 
110 ("[North Carolina I]awmakers were forced to come back to session to 
address the serious safety concerns created by the dangerous ordinance ... 
[which] created a loophole that any man with nefarious motives could use to 
prey on women and young children ... How many fathers are now going to 
be forced to go to the ladies' room to make sure their little girls aren't 
molested?") (quoting North Carolina state legislators). 
67. 	 See Levi & Redman, supra note 11, at 144-45. 
68. 	 Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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denjed appropriate single-sex services, such as transgender men who are 
forced to use a women's restroom, or transgender women who are 
incarcerated in a men's prison.69 
Defenders of laws that require transgender people to undergo gender 
confirmation surgery in order to change the sex marker on their birth 
certificates similarly rely on public safety arguments. Permitting a 
transgender person to change the sex marker on a birth certificate absent 
surgery, the State of New Jersey argued in the case of Doe v. Arrjsj, "would 
constitute a State-sanctioned inaccuracy" because sex "refers only to 
anatomical attributes."70 Besides enabling transgender people to obtain 
"inaccurate" documents, it would also allow a "bad actor" to "abuse the 
system" by creating multiple versions of otherwise genuine birth 
certificates "to use for nefarious purposes, such as identify theft, 
defrauding government benefits programs, and defrauding immigration 
officials."71 
A second reason that fuels the denial of appropriate single-sex services 
for transgender people is morality. Just as gender-norming laws were said 
to preserve the public's "aesthetic preferences," some argue that denying 
transgender people's use of appropriate single-sex services preserves the 
expectations about how people should behave and what gender norms 
should apply.72 People should not transition, the argument goes, and so 
recognition of transgender people's gender identity should be 
discouraged.73 Upending expectations about gender norms, defenders 
69. 	 Mass. Dep't of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *4 (stating that Ms. Doe 
"fear[ ed] ... falling victim to sexual violence, and ... she began experiencing 
difficulty sleeping after men gawked at her from the [prison] tier above her 
as she showered") (citation omitted); see also id. (stating that, according to 
Ms. Doe, "prisoners often harass her sexually in the bathrooms, with the 
knowledge and tacit approval of DOC staff') (citation omitted). 
70. 	 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 20, Doe v. Arrisi, No. 3:16-cv-
08640-MAS-DEA (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017). 
71. 	 Id. at 19. 
72. 	 Compare City of Chicago, 389 N.E.2d at 525, with Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 
33162199, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (discussing "the stifling of plaintiffs 
selfhood merely because it causes some members of the community 
discomfort."). 
73. 	 See, e.g., Brief of Appellees at 27, Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 
(10th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-4193), cited in Levi & Redman, supra note 11, at 
146 ("We Jive in a relatively conservative area and I think there are 
expectations of the customer in how a [public transit] employee is going to 
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argue, leads to "disruption"-for example, interruption of a company's 
work routine based on the complaints of female employees who "indicateO 
they would quit if [a transgender person] were permitted to use the 
restroom facilities assigned to female personnel."74 Urging passage of HB 
2, North Carolina state senator David Curtis railed against those who 
would 
tryO to redefine everything about our society. Gender and 
marriage-just the whole liberal agenda .... The gays would go 
into a business, make some outrageous demand that they know 
the owner cannot comply with and file a lawsuit against that 
business owner and put him out ofbusiness.75 
North Carolina state senator David Brock similarly warned of 
"pervert[s] walk[ing] into a bathroom ... [when] my little girls are in 
there."76 At a hearing on a school policy that limited restrooms "to the 
corresponding biological genders," supporters of the school policy 
deliberately misgendered Gavin Grimm, a transgender boy; called him a 
"freak"; and "compared him to a person who thinks he is a 'dog' and wants 
to urinate on fire hydrants."77 Defenders of a similar school policy in Board 
of EducaUon of the Highland Local School District v. United States 
Department ofEducation likewise cited the "dignity ... of other students" 
and "lewdness concerns."78 To allow a transgender boy to use a boy's 
restroom, they argued, was crude and offensive; it was beneath them. 
A third and closely-related reason for denying transgender people 
access to appropriate single-sex services is privacy. This argument rests on 
the idea that transgender people violate the privacy of those who do not 
wish to see or be seen by someone they perceive or believe to be of a 
behave, and if a customer sees a bus operator entering a female restroom 
one day and a male restroom another day, that can be pretty 
disconcerting."). 
74. 	 Id 
75. 	 Carcano Compl. if 110. 
76. 	 Id 
77. 	 G.G. ex rel Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716 (4th Cir. 
2016), vacated andremanded, 137 S. Ct 1239 (2017). 
78. 	 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874. 
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different sex.79 Because everyone has gendered body parts, these 
advocates argue, laws that segregate services based on externally visible 
sex characteristics are not discriminatory but are instead facially neutral.Bo 
Recognition of people's gender identity as the determinant of a person's 
sex, they further argue, would open the floodgates, eviscerating all 
reasonable sex-based restrictions.Bl As the State of Utah argued over a 
decade ago in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, "any male ... could dress as 
79. 	 See G.G., 822 F.3d at 731 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's 
"unprecedented holding" permitting transgender student to access 
appropriate single-sex restroom "overrule[d] custom, culture, and the very 
demands inherent in human nature for privacy and safety, which the 
separation of such facilities is designed to protect"); see also Bd. of Educ. of 
the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 
at 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (discussing defendants' argument that plaintiff, "if 
allowed to use the girls' restroom, would infringe upon the privacy rights 
of. .. other students"); Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist No. 1 Bd. of 
Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017) ("The School District did not permit 
Ash to enter the boys' restroom becauseO it believed[] that his mere 
presence would invade the privacy rights of his male classmates."); McCrory, 
203 F. Supp. 3d at 642 (discussing argument "that bodily privacy interests 
arise from physiological differences between men and women, and that sex 
should therefore be defined in terms of physiology for the purposes of 
bathrooms, showers, and other similar facilities"); Evancho v. Pine-Richland 
Sch. Dist, 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 278 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (discussing "concern that 
the partially clothed body of a student of a given assigned sex would be 
observed in a restroom by a student of the opposite assigned sex"); Texas v. 
United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 832 (N.D. Tex. 2016), order clarified, No. 
7:16-CV-00054-0, 2016 WL 7852331 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2016) (discussing 
"privacy right to avoid exhibiting their 'nude or partially nude body, 
genitalia, and other private parts' before members of the opposite sex") 
(citation omitted). 
80. 	 See G.G., 822 F.3d at 731 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (discussing "universally 
accepted protections of privacy and safety that are based on the anatomical 
differences between the sexes"). 
81. 	 See id at 736 (stating that majority's decision permitting transgender 
students to access appropriate single-sex restrooms "would have to be 
applied uniformly. . . . [to] separate living facilities, ... locker rooms, and 
shower facilities"); see also Levi & Redman, supra note 11, at 145 ("Several 
courts treat bathroom access for transgender people as a bridge too far, after 
which all reasonable gender-based restrictions would fall."). 
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a woman, use female restrooms, shower rooms and locker rooms, and any 
attempt ... to prohibit such conduct" would violate the law.82 
2. Constitutional Review of Denial of Appropriate Single-Sex 
Services 
(a) Equal Protection 
An overwhelming majority of lower courts over the past decade have 
held that laws and policies that deny transgender people access to 
appropriate single-sex services violate equal protection.83 Applying 
heightened scrutiny on the theory that such discrimination is based on sex 
stereotypes, or that discrimination based on transgender status is, itself, a 
suspect/quasi-suspect classification, these courts have consistently 
rejected the three justifications offered in support of such laws and 
policies. 
In Highland, for example, the court rejected "amorphous safety 
concerns" as a justification for prohibiting a transgender girl from using 
the girls' restroom, noting that "no incidents of individuals using an 
inclusive policy to gain access to sex-segregated facilities for an improper 
purpose have everoccurred."84 According to the court, these concerns 
82. 	 Brief of Appellees at 32, No. 05-4193, Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 
1215 (10th Cir. 2007), cited jn Levi & Redman, supra note 11, at 146. 
Numerous courts have called EtsHty into question. See, e.g., M.A.8. v. Bd. of 
Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 714 (D. Md. 2018) (stating that "it is unclear 
what, if any, significance to ascribe to th[e] holdingO" in, inter aHa, EtsHty 
"because in light of Prke Waterhouse, transgender individuals may bring 
sex-discrimination claims under a gender-stereotyping theory" (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
83. 	 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (collecting cases holding that 
discrimination against transgender people violates equal protection). 
84. 	 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 
3d 850, 876 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (quoting G.G., 822 F.3d at 723 n.11); see also 
Carcano v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 652 (M.D.N.C. 2016) ("[T]here is no 
evidence that transgender individuals overall are any more likely to engage 
in predatory behaviors than other segments of the population . . . . [T]he 
unrefuted evidence in the current record suggests that jurisdictions that 
have adopted accommodating bathroom access policies have not observed 
subsequent increases in crime."). 
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"turned out to be wholly unfounded in practice."Bs In Evancho, the court 
rejected the related argument that such policies are necessary to prevent 
"unlawful malicious 'peeping Tom' activity by anyone pretending to be 
transgender."B6 According to the court, there was "no record evidence of 
an actual or threatened outbreak of other students falsely or deceptively 
declaring themselves to be 'transgender' for the purpose of engaging in 
untoward and maliciously improper activities in the High School 
restrooms," and, even if there were, "existing disciplinary rules of the 
District and the laws of Pennsylvania would address such matters."B7 
Justifications based on moral preference have similarly failed. In 
Evancho v. Pine-Richland School District, the court refused to credit school 
officials' statements that "several parents had, and others would, 
move their children to other schools if the Board did not enact a policy" 
that denied transgender students access to appropriate single-sex 
services.BB Echoing the Supreme Court's warning against "deferring to the 
wishes or objections of some fraction of the body politic" in Cleburne, the 
Evancho court stated that: 
[i]f adopting and implementing a school policy or practice based 
on those individual determinations or preferences of parents-no 
85. 	 Id (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Evancho v. Pine-Richland 
Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 289 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (finding "no record" of 
"any actual or incipient threat, disturbance or other disruption of school 
activities by the Plaintiffs"); accord G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. 
Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 724 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 
1239 (2017) ("We are unconvinced of the existence of danger caused by 
'sexual responses prompted by students' exposure to the private body parts 
of students of the other biological sex.' The same safety concern would seem 
to require segregated restrooms for gay boys and girls who would, under the 
dissent's formulation, present a safety risk because of the 'sexual responses 
prompted' by their exposure to the private body parts of other students of 
the same sex in sex-segregated restrooms.''); Carcano v. McCrory, 203 F. 
Supp. 3d 615, 639 & n.28 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (finding no evidence of people 
pretending to be transgender and entering a restroom anywhere in the 
University of North Carolina system, nor in any other educational 
institutions in North Carolina). 
86. 	 Evancho, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 291. 
87. 	 Id; see also Levi & Redman, supra note 11, at 161 (discussing statutes and 
ordinances "prohibiting soliciting, importuning, pandering obscenity, public 
indecency, trespassing, or soliciting rides or hitchhiking"). 
88. 	 237 F. Supp. 3d at 291-92. 
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matter how sincerely held-runs counter to the legal obligations 
of the District, then the District's and the Board's legal obligations 
must prevail. Those obligations to the law take precedence over 
responding to constituent desires. The Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is neither applied nor construed by 
popular vote.89 
Nearly two decades earlier, in Doe v. YunHs, the Massachusetts 
Superior Court similarly ordered school officials to permit a transgender 
girl to attend school wearing a girl's uniform, notwithstanding the school's 
stated interest in "fostering conformity with community standards."90 To 
rule otherwise, the court concluded, would "allow the stifling of plaintiffs 
selfhood merely because it causes some members of the community 
discomfort.''91 
Privacy arguments have also proved unavailing. In WhHaker, for 
example, the court rejected the school's argument that its policy of 
excluding Ash Whitaker, a transgender boy, from using the boy's restroom 
was necessary "to protect the privacy rights of all [of its] ... students."92 
According to the court, the school's argument, when "weighed against the 
facts of the case and not just examined in the abstract, ... [wa]s based 
upon sheer conjecture and abstraction."93 The facts demonstrated that for 
nearly six months, Mr. Whitaker had used the boys' bathroom "without 
incident or complaint from another student"; there was little risk that Mr. 
Whitaker would violate others' privacy given "the practical reality of how 
[Mr. Whitaker] ... use[d] the bathroom: by entering a stall and closing the 
door"; and the policy was woefully under-inclusive: it did not apply to "an 
overly curious student of the same biological sex who decides to sneak 
glances at his or her classmates performing their bodily functions ... [ o ]r 
for that matter, any other student who uses the bathroom at the same 
89. 	 Id at 292. 
90. 	 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct 2000). 
91. 	 Id 
92. 	 Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 
F.3d 1034, 1052 (7th Cir. 2017). 
93. 	 Id; see also Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 n.10 (4th 
Cir. 2016) ("We doubt that G.G.'s use of the communal restroom of his choice 
threatens the type of constitutional abuses present in the [privacy] cases 
cited by the dissent."). 
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time," nor did it separate "pre-pubescent" from "post-pubescent children 
who do not look alike anatomically."94 
Likewise, in Evancho, the court concluded that, "[a]Jthough the record 
reveal[ed] some specific concerns driven by the reputed presence (and 
presence alone) of a [transgender person] in a restroom matching her 
gender identity, there is no record evidence that this actually imperiled or 
risked imperiling any privacy interest of any person," particularly "given 
the actual physical layout of the student restrooms at the High School."95 
Furthermore, according to the court in Carcano v. McCrory, far from 
protecting privacy, denying access to appropriate single-sex facilities 
would "create privacy problems, as it would require the individual 
transgender Plaintiffs, who outwardly appear as the sex with which they 
identify, to enter facilities designated for the opposite sex (e.g., requiring 
stereotypically-masculine appearing transgender individuals to use 
women's bathrooms), thus prompting unnecessary alarm and suspicion."96 
(b) Substantive Due Process 
In addition to equal protection claims, some courts have addressed 
whether the denial of appropriate single-sex services violates substantive 
due process. In Doe v. Massachusetts Department of Corrections, for 
example, the District of Massachusetts held that a transgender woman 
who was incarcerated in a men's prison stated a claim for a violation of her 
fundamental rights "to bodily autonomy and privacy" under the Due 
Process Clause.97 By housing the plaintiff in a men's prison, the State had 
imposed on her "atypical and significant hardship[s] .. in relation to the 
normal incidents of prison life," including "fears for her physical safety, the 
94. 	 Id at 1052-53. 
95. 	 Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 290 (W.D. Pa. 2017) 
(stating that the protection of students' privacy interests, "like any stated 
governmental interest, must be considered in the context of the 'facts on the 
ground,' not only as a broadly stated goal," and concluding that "the facts in 
this case do not establish any threatened or actually occurring violations of 
personal privacy"); see also Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. 
U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016) ("There is no 
evidence that Jane herself, if allowed to use the girls' restroom, would 
infringe upon the privacy rights of any other students."). 
96. 	 McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 652. 
97. 	 Doe v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *11 (D. Mass. 2018). 
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potential for sexual violence and assault, the trauma and stigmatization 
instilled by undergoing regular strip-searches by male guards and, on 
occasion, being forced to shower in the presence of male inmates."98 
Even when courts do not rule on substantive due process grounds, 
these claims serve an important secondary function. Like equal protection 
arguments regarding the immutability of being transgender, 99 substantive 
due process arguments regarding liberty, privacy, and the "autonomy of 
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain 
intimate conduct" help courts understand the seriousness of being 
transgender. 100 Treating a transgender woman as a man for purposes of 
accessing single-sex facilities not only subjects her to unequal treatment­
. it also violates a core aspect of her identity. 
C. Exclusion ofTransgender People from Anti-Discrimination Laws 
In addition to laws that once criminalized transgender people's 
expression of identity and those that currently deny transgender people's 
access to appropriate single-sex services, there are a number of laws that 
deprive transgender people of anti-discrimination protections. They do so 
in one of two ways: directly through facially discriminatory classifications, 
as demonstrated by various federal disability rights laws; and indirectly 
through facially neutral classifications that are motivated by 
discriminatory intent, as demonstrated by state laws preempting local 
anti-discrimination ordinances.101 In the sections that follow, we discuss 
both in turn. 
1. Federal Disability Rights Laws 
Three federal laws that protect people from discrimination based on 
disability-the Fair Housing Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans 
98. 	 Id 
99. 	 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
100. 	 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) ("The Constitution promises liberty to all 
within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow 
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity."). 
101. 	 See Erwin CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 698 (5th 
ed. 2015); see also infra notes 102-43 and accompanying text (discussing 
federal disability rights laws and state preemption laws). 
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with Disabilities Act ("ADA")-facially discriminate against transgender 
people.102 They do so by explicitly denying protections for obsolete 
medical conditions closely associated with transgender people, including 
"transsexualism" and "gender identity disorder."103 
Since 2014, transgender people have challenged their exclusion from 
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.104 In Blatt v. Cabela's Retaj/, Inc., for 
example, a transgender woman diagnosed with gender dysphoria, a 
serious medical condition characterized by a marked incongruence 
between one's assigned sex at birth and one's gender identity, which 
results in clinically significant distress, sued her employer for 
discrimination under the ADA.105 When Cabela's moved to dismiss the 
ADA claim based on the ADA's transgender exclusion, Ms. Blatt argued that 
the exclusion violated equal protection.106 The exclusion was entitled to 
heightened scrutiny, she argued, because discrimination based on 
transgender status is a suspect/quasi-suspect classification under the 
102. 	 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(l) (2012) (prohibiting disability discrimination in, 
inter alia, employment, government benefits and services, and public 
accommodations, and excluding, inter alia, "transsexualism" and "gender 
identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments" from ADA's 
definition of disability); id. § 12208 (2018) (excluding coverage of 
"transvestites" from ADA's definition of disability); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F)(i) 
(2012) (prohibiting federal agencies and recipients of federal funds from 
discriminating based on disability, and excluding, inter alia, "transsexualism" 
and "gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments" 
from Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability); 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (2012) 
(prohibiting housing providers and lending institutions from discriminating 
based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, or 
disability, and excluding "transvestites" from definition of disability under 
Fair Housing Act and Rehabilitation Act through a statutory note to§ 3602). 
103. 	 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
104. 	 Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi, Blatt v. Cabela's Retail, Inc. and a New Path for 
Transgender Rights, 127 YALE L.J. F. 373 (2017) (stating that, 
"notwithstanding well-intentioned concerns, the overwhelming consensus 
among transgender rights advocates is strongly in favor of ADA coverage of 
gender dysphoria," and arguing that well-intentioned criticism toward 
pursuing disability rights protections for transgender people reflects 
misunderstanding of both the realities of gender dysphoria and the 
definition of "disability" in disability rights laws). 
105. 	 No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL, 2017 WL 2178123, at*l-2 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017). 
106. 	 Id. at *2. 
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Supreme Court's four-factor test and, alternatively, because transgender 
discrimination is necessarily sex-based.107 
No matter what level of scrutiny is applied, Ms. Blatt argued that the 
exclusion violated equal protection because it was rooted in moral animus 
against transgender people, which is not a legitimate purpose-much less 
a compelling or important one.108 For this proposition, she pointed to 
direct evidence of animus in the ADA's legislative history, as well as 
indirect evidence of animus gleaned from the structure and practical effect 
of the exclusion.109 For example, the exclusion singled out a conspicuously 
narrow group of people-transgender people-from bringing claims 
despite the fact that the excluded medical conditions associated with being 
transgender are well-established and recognized by the medical 
community.11° The exclusion was also overly broad: the ADA excludes not 
107. 	See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Partial 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 15-28, Blatt v. 
Cabela's Retail, Inc., (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2015) (No. 5:14-CV-04822), 2017 WL 
2178123 [hereinafter BlattMem. Opp'n]; see, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 
1312, 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of transgender employee because "discriminating against 
someone on the basis of his or her gender non-conformity constitutes sex­
based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause" and is therefore 
"subject to heightened scrutiny"). 
108. 	See BlattMem. Opp'n, supra note 107, at 28-39; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (concluding that "a bare ... desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legHimate governmental 
interest"-much less a compelling or important one) (quoting U.S. Dep't of 
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (alteration in original); accord 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013). 
109. 	See BlattMem. Opp'n, supra note 107, at 28-39; see, e.g., Windsor, 570 U.S. at 
770 (invalidating Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) based on evidence of 
animus in DOMA's text, legislative history, structure, and effect); Romer, 517 
U.S. at 632 (invalidating constitutional amendment that prohibited civil 
rights protections for LGB people based on evidence of animus in 
amendment's structure and effect). 
110. · Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012) (broadly defining "disability"), and AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 71­
78 (3d ed. 1987) (recognizing medical diagnoses of "gender identity 
disorder" and "transsexualism"), with 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2012) 
(excluding. inter alia, "transsexualism" and "gender identity disorders"); see 
also Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 ("A law declaring that in general it shall be more 
difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the 
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only people who have the listed conditions but also those who have 
treated their conditions or who are perceived as having them, and it flatly 
prohibits such people from bringing a disability discrimination claim in all 
settings, including employment, government services, and public 
accommodations.111 Additionally, the exclusion is of an unusual character: 
civil rights laws generally do not exclude narrow groups of people; they 
apply to everyone based on identified characteristics.112 The ADA, in 
particular, was intended broadly to prohibit discrimination based on a 
health condition, regardless of how limiting that condition may be-a fact 
made clear by the 2008 amendments to the ADA, which reversed several 
government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most 
literal sense."); accord. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 771-72 ("DOMA's principal 
effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them 
unequal."). 
111. 	 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012) (defining "disability" to include those with a 
record of a disability and those who are regarded as having a disability); id. 
§§ 12101(a)(3), (b)(l) (providing "a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities" in various settings, including "employment, housing, public 
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, 
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services"); 
see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 633, 635 (invalidating constitutional amendment 
the prohibited civil rights protections for LGB people because it was "at 
once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and 
then denies them protection across the board . . . . The breadth of the 
amendment is so far removed from Degitimate] ... justifications that we find 
it impossible to credit them."); accord mndsor, 570 U.S. at 765 (stating that 
"DOMA has a far greater reach [than congressional statutes which affect 
marriages and family status]; for it enacts a directive applicable to over 
1,000 federal statutes and the whole realm of federal regulations"). 
112. 	 See e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 
(1976) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of 
'any individual' because of 'such individual's race' .... Its terms are not 
limited to discrimination against members of any particular race.") (internal 
citations omitted); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 ("[D]iscriminations of an 
unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine 
whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision."); accord. 
mndsor, 570 U.S. at 770 ("DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual 
tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here 
operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities 
that come with the federal recognition of their marriages."). 
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Supreme Court decisions that "narrowed the broad scope of protection 
intended to be afforded by the ADA."113 Lastly, the exclusion's practical 
effect was to impose a stigma on transgender people as being unworthy of 
civil rights protection.114 
(a) Justification for Federal Disability Laws that Deprive 
Transgender People of Anti-Discrimination Protections 
As Ms. Blatt and other transgender litigants have argued, Congress's. 
reasons for excluding transgender people from various federal disability 
rights laws were explicitly moral, based on dislike of the group for a range 
of reasons including a view that transgender people are "deviant."115 The 
story behind these exclusions dates back to the mid-1980s, when at least 
two federal courts interpreted the Rehabilitation Act, a law that prohibits 
disability discrimination by federally-funded entities, to protect 
transgender employees.116 In response, Senator Jesse Helms, a staunch 
113. 	ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(4)-(5), 122 Stat 
3553; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012) (prohibiting discrimination 
against an individual who "has been subjected to an action prohibited under 
this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a 
major life activity"); id §§ 12102(1), (4)(E)(i) (prohibiting the refusal to 
accommodate an individual whose physical or mental impairment would, in 
the absence oftreatment, be "substantially limit[ing]"). 
114. 	See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770 (holding that DOMA's 
"practical effect" was "to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a 
stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
unquestioned authority of the States"); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634­
35 (1996) ("[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference 
that the disadvantage imposed· is born of animosity toward the class of 
persons affected .... Amendment 2, ... in making a general announcement 
that gays and iesbians shall not have any particular protections from the 
law, inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and 
belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it."). 
115. 	See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text. 
116. 	 Blackwell v. Dep't of Treasury, 656 F. Supp. 713, 714-15 (D.D.C. 1986), affd 
in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 830 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Doe 
v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 9446, at *2-3 (D.D.C. June 12, 
1985). The authors have written extensively about this history. For more 
information, see Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender 
People and the Equal Protection Clause, 57 8.C. L. REV. 507 (2016); Barry & 
622 
TRANSGENDER TROPES & CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
critic of civil rights laws ~nd a founding member of the Moral Majority,117 
attacked these decisions in an attempt to defeat passage of the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act, which sought to expand the reach of the Rehabilitation 
Act and other civil rights laws.118 According to Helms, the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act would prevent private institutions that received federal 
financial assistance from refusing to hire a transgender person "because 
some Federal court may find that this violates the [person's] civil rights to 
wear a dress and to wear foam, that sort of thing[.] Do we really want to 
prohibit these private institutions from making employment decisions 
based on moral qualifications?"119 
Months later, during Senate debate on the Fair Housing Amendments 
Act, which sought to prohibit housing discrimination based on disability 
status, Helms successfully argued for the bill's exclusion of protection for 
transgender people (whom he termed "transvestites")-calling his 
Levi, supra note 104; Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability 
Rights Protection for Transgender People, 16 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 1 
(2013); see also Ruth Colker, Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act; 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 33, 38 
(2004) (discussing legislative history of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 
1987, Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, and Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990); Christine Michelle Duffy, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in GENDER 
IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE ch. 16-37-16-42 (2014) (discussing legislative history of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990). 
117. 	The Moral Majority was a conservative lobbying firm led by Jerry Falwell 
and Jerry Nims. See 134 CONG. REC. 4602 (1988), aval'lable at 1988 WL 
1084953 (special memorandum to pastors from the Moral Majority, Jerry 
Falwell, Chairman and Jerry Nims, President urging pastors to lobby 
members of Congress to sustain President Ronald Reagan's veto of Civil 
Rights Restoration Act, and warning that the Act would "protect active 
homosexuals, transvestites, alcoholics and drug addicts, among others, 
under the government's antidiscrimination laws. These sins will be 
considered to be diseases or handicaps" under "this perverted law"). 
118. 	 See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, 
28-30 (1988) (abrogating the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Grove City 
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), which limited the application of Title IX 
to federally-funded programs or activities within an institution rather than 
applying the statute to the institution as a whole). Id at 573-74. 
119. 	 134 CONG. REC. 4235 (1988) (statement of Sen. Helms), available atl988 WL 
1084657. 
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amendment "a little common sense."120 Notably, Senator Alan Cranston, 
one of only two senators to oppose Helms's amendment, argued that the 
Helms amendment was fueled by moral animus against transgender 
people, "singl[ing] out one category of individuals who are already being 
discriminated against and say[ing] to them, 'Sorry you now have no 
protections. Congress has decided that it no longer cares whether or not 
you are cast out of our society."'121 
In 1989, Senators Helms, Orrin Hatch, and William Armstrong 
successfully proposed two separate amendments to exclude transgender 
people from protection under the ADA. Senator Helms's amendment to 
the ADA mirrored his amendment to the Fair Housing Act, while the 
Armstrong-Hatch amendment was even broader, excluding three now 
obsolete medical conditions associated with transgender people 
(transvestism, transsexualism, and gender identity disorders), together 
with approximately eight other medical conditions, including kleptomania, 
pyromania, psychoactive substance abuse orders resulting from illegal 
drug use, and sexual behavior disorders such as pedophilia, exhibitionism, 
and voyeurism.122 
Echoing his remarks during the debate on the Civil Rights Restoration 
Act, Senator Helms defended the ADA's exclusion of transgender people by 
arguing that an employer ought to be able to "set up ... moral standards 
for his business" and to tell an employee, "[L]ook I feel very strongly about 
· people who engage in sexually deviant behavior or unlawful sexual 
120. 	134 CONG. REC. Sl0,470 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Helms) 
(on file with author); see Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-430, § 6(b)(3), 102 Stat. 1619, 1622 (1988) (codified as a note to 42 
U.S.C. § 3602) (excluding coverage of "transvestites" from both the Fair 
Housing Act and the Rehabilitation Act). 
121. 	134 CONG. REC. Sl0,470-71 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Alan 
Cranston). 
122. 	Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12208 (2018) (excluding coverage of "transvestites" 
from the ADA), and135 CONG. REC. Sl0,765, Sl0,776 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), 
available at 1989 WL 183216 (referencing passage of Sen. Helms's 
amendment to the Fair Housing Amendments Act and noting passage of Sen. 
Helm's identical amendment no. 716 to the ADA), with 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) 
(2018) (excluding coverage of various medical conditions from the ADA), 
and135 CONG. REC. Sl0,785-86 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (noting passage of 
Armstrong-Hatch amendment no. 722 to the ADA), available at 1989 WL 
183216. 
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practices."123 Senator Armstrong objected "to provid[ing] a protected legal 
status" to transgender people and others whose medical conditions "might 
have a moral content to them."124 Senator Warren Rudman likewise 
characterized the conditions excluded by the Armstrong-Hatch 
amendment as "socially unacceptable" and "lack[ing] any physiological 
basis. In short, we are talking about behavior that is immoral, improper, or 
illegal and which individuals are _engaging in of their own volition .... 
[P]eople must bear some responsibility for the consequences of their own 
actions.'' 125 Two years after passage of the ADA, Congress amended the 
Rehabilitation Act to exclude protection for the same conditions excluded 
by the ADA, including those associated with transgender people.126 At the 
state level, approximately ten states followed suit, importing identical 
exclusions into their state anti-discrimination laws.127 
(b) Constitutional Review ofFederal Disability Laws that Deprive 
Transgender People of Anti-Discrimination Protections 
No published court decision to date has expressly decided whether 
federal disability rights law's exclusion of transgender people violates 
equal protection. Instead, courts have consistently eschewed the question 
123. 	 135 CONG. REC. Sl0,772 (daily ed. Sept 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms), 
availableat1989WL183216. 
124. 	 135 CONG. REC. Sl0,753-54 (daily ed. Sept 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. 
William Armstrong), available at 1989 WL 183115 (stating that he had "a 
whole list of [protected health conditions] ... drawn from court cases," and 
that he would "submit this list" to the ADA's sponsors for exclusion from the 
ADA); see also 135 CONG. REC. Sl11,75 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989), available at 
1989 WL 183785 Oisting various health conditions protected under the 
Rehabilitation Act, including "Sexual Disorders: .Transvestism and 
Transsexualism"); 135 CONG. REC. Sl0,785 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) 
(statement of Sen. Armstrong), available at 1989 WL 183216 (proposing 
amendment to exclude, inter a/Ja, "transvestism ... transsexualism ... [and] 
gender identity disorders"). 
125. 	 135 CONG. REC. Sl0,796 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Warren 
Rudman), availableat1989 WL 183216. 
126. 	 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F) (2018); H.R. REP. No. 102-973, at 158 (1992) (Conf. 
Rep.), available at 1992 WL 322488 (discussing amendment of the 
Rehabilitation Act to include the ADA's exclusion of coverage of certain 
health conditions). 
127. 	 Barry et al., A Bare Deske to Harm, supra note 116, at 523. 
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by invoking the canon of constitutional avoidance and ruling in favor of 
transgender litigants on statutory grounds.128 In Blatt, for example, the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied an employer's motion to dismiss 
on grounds that the ADA's exclusion of "gender identity disorder" refers 
only to transgender identity-not the medical condition of gender 
dysphoria that is associated with transgender people.129 In Edmo v. Idaho 
Department ofCorrectjons, the District of Idaho denied the State's motion 
to dismiss on grounds that the plaintiff had raised "a genuine dispute of 
material fact" regarding whether gender dysphoria fell within the ADA's 
and Rehabilitation Act's safe harbor for gender identity disorders "not 
resulting from physical impairments."130 And in Doe v. Massachusetts 
Department of Correction, the District of Massachusetts dismissed the 
State's motion to dismiss on grounds that, jnter aHa, gender dysphoria "is 
not merely another term for 'gender identity disorder,"' but is instead a 
distinct diagnosis with different diagnostic criteria and, therefore, is not 
excluded by the ADA's and Rehabilitation Act's exclusion of "gender 
identity disorders." 131 
Courts' reliance on the canon of constitutional avoidance in this 
context is significant because it implicitly underscores the dubious 
constitutionality of federal disability law's exclusion of transgender 
people. As the District of Massachusetts reasoned, interpreting the ADA 
and Rehabilitation Act to exclude medical conditions associated with 
128. 	Under this canon of statutory construction, "a court has a duty where 'a 
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised' with respect to a statutory 
provision to 'first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly 
possible by which [a constitutional] question may be avoided."' Doe v. Mass. 
Dep't. of Corr., No. 17-12255-RGS, 2018 WL 2994403, at *7 (D. Mass. June 14, 
2018) (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
129. 	 Blatt v. Cabela's Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017) ("[I]t is fairly possible to interpret the term gender 
identity disorders narrowly to refer to simply the condition of identifying 
with a different gender, not to exclude from ADA coverage disabling 
conditions that persons who identify with a different gender may have­
such as Blatt's gender dysphoria."). 
130. 	Edmo v. Idaho Dep't of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-00151-BLW, 2018 WL 2745898, at 
*8 (D. Idaho June 7, 2018); see also Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *1 
(discussing plaintiffs claims under ADA and Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act). 
131. 	 Doev. Mass. Dep't of Corr., No.17-12255-RGS, 2018 WL 2994403, at *6-7. 
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transgender people would raise "a serious doubt of constitutionality" 
because it would "exclude an entire category of people from its 
protections" for no apparent reason other than to express disapproval of 
their transgender status.132 "The pairing of gender identity disorders with 
conduct that is criminal or viewed by society as immoral or lewd," the 
court stated, 
raises a serious question as to the light in which the drafters of this 
exclusion viewed transgender persons. Also excluded are '(2) 
compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania' and '(3) 
psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current 
illegal use of drugs.' Here, again, the statute excludes from a 
possible ADA claim activities that are illegal, dangerous to society, 
or the result of harmful vices. 133 
Invoking Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the District of 
Massachusetts concluded that an interpretation of federal disability law to 
exclude transgender people would be tantamount to "tolerat[ing] classes 
among citizens" and was therefore "best avoided."134 
2. State Preemption Laws 
In addition to federal disability rights laws that explicitly exclude 
protections for transgender people, at least one state, North Carolina, has 
passed two successive laws that achieve a similar result by prohibiting 
municipalities from passing "new or amended" anti-discrimination 
ordinances to protect transgender people.135 Although North Carolina's 
prohibition applies to the enactment or amendment of all new or amended 
anti-discrimination ordinances, and is therefore facially neutral, 
transgender litigants argue that the effect of these laws is to deprive anti­
discrimination protections to those not already protected by existing anti­
discrimination laws-namely, transgender people.136 Accordingly, they 
132. 	 Id at *7-8. 
133. 	 Id at *7. 
134. 	 Id at *8 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
135. 	 See Carcafio v. Cooper, 350 F. Supp. 3d 388, 398-401 (M.D.N.C. 2018) 
(discussing North Carolina's enactment of HB 2 and HB 142, the former of 
which was subsequently repealed). 
136. 	 See id at 418. 
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argue, state preemption laws discriminate against transgender people in 
violation of equal protection.137 
(a) Justifications for State Preemption Laws that Deprive 
Transgender People of Anti-Discrimination Protections 
States' justifications for these preemption laws, although couched in 
terms of an interest in "state-wide uniformity,"138 are premised on 
familiar concerns regarding criminality, morality, and privacy, which, in 
turn, derive from standard tropes about transgender people. North 
Carolina's preemption laws, for example, were part and parcel of a broader 
effort to deny transgender people access to appropriate single-sex services 
under local law-an effort fueled by hurtful tropes about hypothetical 
"sexual predators ... prey[ing] on persons in vulnerable places," "men" 
using "women's bathrooms and locker rooms," and the "common sense" 
infringement of non-transgender people's privacy.139 North Carolina's 
justifications for its preemption laws are closely analogous to those 
offered in support of Colorado's constitutional amendment over two 
decades ago, which similarly preempted civil rights protections for gays, 
lesbians, and bisexual people based on "personal or religious objections to 
homosexuality"-what Justice Antonin Scalia referred to as "traditional 
American moral values."140 
(b) Constitutional Review of State Preemption Laws that Deprive 
Transgender People of Anti-Discrimination Protections 
In Carcano v. Cooper, the Middle District of North Carolina denied the 
State's motion to dismiss an equal protection challenge to a facially neutral 
state preemption law on grounds that the law was "motivated, at least in 
part, by discriminatory intent" toward transgender people.141 Of 
137. 	 /dat419. 
138. 	 Id at 422 ("Plaintiffs argue ... [that] any governmental purpose for HB142's 
preemption provisions resting on statewide uniformity can only be a 
'pretext' for the same sort of discrimination that was more explicit in HB2."). 
139. 	Carcano v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 652 (2016); Comp!. at if 110, 
Carcano v. McCrory (M.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-00236). 
140. 	 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see id at 651 (Scalia, J.. 
dissenting). 
141. 	 350F.Supp.3dat419. 
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significance to the court was the fact that HB 142 and its predecessor, HB 
2, were passed in response to a "Charlotte ordinance that granted anti­
discrimination protections to transgender individuals"; the laws' 
disproportionate impact on transgender people who, unlike other 
vulnerable groups, lacked protections under existing state and local anti­
discrimination laws; and "[d]epartures from the normal procedural 
sequence" used to pass the laws, which were "introduced, debated, passed, 
signed, and went into effect within a single day."142 Given this evidence, 
and a lack of support for the law's "conceivable purpose of statewide 
uniformity," the court concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a claim that 
the preemption law lacked any "rational basis" in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.143 
D. Exclusion from the U.S. Military 
Prior to 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense explicitly prohibited 
transgender people from enlisting or serving in the military.144 In June 
2016, the Department changed course, based on its high level review, 
supported by a detailed study by the RAND Corporation, which concluded 
that there was no evidence that allowing transgender individuals to serve 
would have any effect on "unit cohesion," and rejected any readiness and 
142. 	 Id at 418-19. 
143. 	 Id at 422; see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (invalidating state constitutional 
amendment that preempted civil rights protections for lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual people on grounds that it "impos[ed] a broad and undifferentiated 
disability on a single named group," and "its sheer breadth [wa]s so 
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment 
seem[ed] inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it 
lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests"). 
144. 	 Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 180 (2017) [hereinafter Doe v. Trump 
lJ (discussing Secretary of Defense Ash Carter's issuance of memorandum on 
June 30, 2016 "establishing a policy, assigning responsibilities, and 
prescribing procedures for the retention, accession, separation, in-service 
transition and medical coverage for transgender personnel serving in the 
Military Services") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id at 178-79 
(discussing changes to regulations in August 2014 disqualifying transgender 
service). In 2011, the Department of Defense repealed its "Don't Ask Don't 
Tell" policy of excluding of LGB people-but not transgender people. 
See Duffy, supra note 116, at 16-140. 
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cost justifications for the exclusion.145 Accordingly, the Department 
adopted a protocol to permit transgender service members to transition 
genders, and stated that, within one year, it would begin allowing 
transgender candidates who had completed gender transition at least 18 
months prior to the date of submission of materials to enlist in the 
military.146 
In the summer of 2017, following the election of Donald Trump, the 
Department changed course once again, abruptly reverting to its pre-2016 
policy banning transgender people from service. On July 26, 2017, the 
President announced via Twitter that "the United States Government will 
not accept or allow [t]ransgender individuals to serve in any capacity in 
the U.S. Military."147 Transgender people were, in his words, a "burdenD" 
on the military, imposing "tremendous medical costs and disruption."148 A 
formal Presidential Memorandum followed on August 25, 2017, which, 
among other things, directed the Department of Defense to submit a plan 
to the President that prohibited "openly transgender individuals from 
[enlisting in] ... the United States military and authorized the discharge of 
such individuals" until such time as the Department could conclude that 
openly transgender service members would not "hinder military 
effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military 
resources."149 
On January 1, 2018, after current and aspiring transgender service 
members successfully sued to enjoin the implementation of the 2017 
Presidential Memorandum, the military began permitting transgender 
individuals to enlist.150 But the Department did not relent. In March 2018, 
President Truinp released the recommendations of Secretary of Defense 
James Mattis (Mattis Plan) with respect to implementing the transgender 
145. 	 Doe v. Trump I, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 179. The RAND Corporation is "a nonprofit 
research institution that provides research and analysis to the Armed 
Services." Id. 
146. 	 Id. at 180-81 (discussing Secretary of Defense Ash Carter's June 30, 2016 
memorandum). 
147. 	 Id. at 182-83 (quoting President Trump's tweets). 
148. 	 Id. at 183. 
149. 	 Id. at 183-84 (quoting August 25, 2017 Presidential Memorandum). 
150. 	 Doe 2 v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 474, 481 (2018) (hereinafter Doe v. Trump 
llJ. 
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ban announced in the 2017 Presidential Memorandum.151 The Mattis Plan 
achieved the same result as President Trump's announced ban by 
excluding transgender people from service in three separate ways:152 
1. Disqualifying all those with "a history or diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria" who do not live consistently with their "biological sex" 
or require "a change of gender," unless they fall within a narrow 
safe harbor provision that allows those transgender service 
members who relied on the 2016 open-service policy to transition 
in order to remain in service as exceptions to the ban.153 
2. Disqualifying all "persons who require or have undergone 
gender transition."154 
3. Requiring all service members to serve in their biological 
sex.155 
Because transgender people do not identify or live in accord with their 
"biological sex," and because only transgender people undergo gender 
transition, the policy bans all transgender people from service who do not 
suppress their transgender identity.156 
Aspiring and enlisted transgender service members across the country 
challenged the Mattis Plan.157 As in the criminaliza.tion, single-sex access, 
151. 	Seeid.at482-83. 
152. 	 See id. at 482 ("[T]he plan effectively implements such a ban by targeting 
proxies of transgender status, such as 'gender dysphoria' and 'gender 
transition,' and by requiring all service members to serve "in their biological 
sex."). 
153. 	 Id. 
154. 	 Id. 
155. 	 Id. 
156. 	 See id. ("By definition, transgender persons do not identify or live in accord 
with their biological sex, which means that the result of the Mattis 
Implementation Plan is that transgender individuals are generally not 
allowed to serve openly in the military."). 
157. 	Doe v. Trump II, 315 F. Supp. 3d 474 (D.D.C. 2018); Stockman v. Trump, 331 
F. Supp. 3d 990 (C.D. Ca. 2018); Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 
WL 1784464 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 
747 (D. Md. 2017). Each of these cases originally involved challenges to 
President Trump's 2017 tweet and Presidential Memorandum. When the 
Trump administration released the Mattis Plan in March 2018, 
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and civil rights exclusion cases, the plaintiffs in each case alleged that the 
military's exclusion of transgender service members violated equal 
protection and substantive due process.158 Specifically, the plaintiffs 
argued that the Trump administration's exclusion of transgender people 
from military service violated equal protection by discriminating based on 
transgender status (e.g., excluding "transgender persons who require or 
have undergone gender transition" and those "with a history or diagnosis 
of gender dysphoria") and sex (e.g., excluding those who defy gender 
stereotypes by "undergo[ing] gender transition")-both of which receive 
heightened scrutiny.159 Even absent heightened scrutiny, the plaintiffs 
argued, the transgender exclusion failed even the most minimal level of 
scrutiny because it was "inexplicable by anything but animus toward the 
class it affects," given its novelty (revoking rights previously given), over­
inclusiveness (excluding transgender people who meet all requirements of 
fitness for service apart from the criteria designed to exclude them for 
being transgender) and under-inclusiveness (not excluding non­
transgender people whose medical needs are comparable to transgender 
persons).160 
In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the Trump administration's 
exclusion of transgender people from military service violated substantive 
due process because it infringed the exercise of a fundamental right, 
namely, the right "to live in accord with a basic component of their 
"jmplementfingj the President's directive that transgender people be 
excluded from the military," the plaintiffs in these cases challenged the 
Mattis Plan. Doe v. Trump II, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 484 (emphasis in original). 
158. 	 Because the U.S. military's ban on transgender service members was 
federal-not state-action, the plaintiffs challenged the ban pursuant to the 
Fifth Amendment, which, like the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees equal 
protection and substantive due process. See, e.g., Stone, 280 F. Supp. at 768. 
159. 	Doe v. Trump II, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 482 (quoting Mattis Plan); see Pls.' Cross­
Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-8, 10-11, Doe v. Trump (D.D.C. May 11, 
2018) (No. 1:17-cv-01597-CKK) [hereinafter Doe Pls.' Cross-Motion], 
available at https://www.glad.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/dvt-plain 
tiffs-opp-to-defendants-msj-and-cross-msj-judgment-5-11-18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9FDA-GD5X] (discussing discrimination on the basis of 
transgender status and sex); see also Doe v. Trump I, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 
208-10 (D.D.C. 2017) (same). 
160. 	Doe Pls.' Cross-Motion, supra note 159, at 2, 23, 27; see Doe v. Trump I, 275 
F. Supp. 3d at 212-13. 
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identity, just as non-transgender people are able to do."161 The decision to 
exclude transgender service members was also arbitrary and irrational, 
the plaintiffs argued, because it was "made suddenly, with no deliberative 
process, and for no legitimate reason."162 According to the plaintiffs, "the 
only effect of the transgender ban is to exclude transgender applicants 
who are otherwise qualified and fit to serve," which impedes-not 
advances-military readiness.163 
1. Justifications for Exclusion from Military Service 
The Trump Administration has offered several reasons for excluding 
transgender people from the military, all of which echo the familiar tropes 
used to justify laws that criminalized gender-nonconformity, deny access 
to appropriate single-sex services, and deprive transgender people of the 
protection of various anti-discrimination laws.164 
According to the Trump Administration, transgender service members 
threaten public safety. The administration has carefully avoided 
expressing the safety concern in terms of criminality or fraud; instead, the 
administration couches the concern in terms of the impact of service by 
161. 	 Doe Pis.' Cross-Motion, supra note 159, at 37. 
162. 	 Id at 37-39. According to the plaintiffs, the Mattis Plan's "grandfather 
provision," which permitted service members diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria after July 2016 and before the effective date of the Mattis Plan to 
"continue to serve in their preferred gender and receive medically necessary 
treatment for gender dysphoria," did not cure the discrimination. Doe v. 
Trump JI, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 482, 486. Instead, it further contributed to the 
discrimination by stigmatizing the grandfathered group "as mentally 
unstable, burdensome, and dangerous to the safety and privacy of others.'' 
Doe Pis.' Cross-Motion, supra note 159, at 19, 40-41. The fact of their 
continued service also undercuts the administration's argument that 
transgender individuals are not capable of equal service. See id at 34. 
163. 	 Id at 24. 
164. 	 See, e.g., Doe v. Trump I, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 183 (discussing President's 
concern that transgender people would "hinder military effectiveness and 
lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, [and] tax military resources"); see also Doe v. 
Trump JI, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 483-84 (discussing Mattis Plan's underlying 
reasons for excluding transgender people, which included "military 
readiness," "unit cohesion," and "disproportionate costs"). 
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transgender people on "military readiness.''165 Because untreated gender 
dysphoria can lead to self-injury, the administration argues, service 
members with gender dysphoria are a threat to themselves and, by 
extension, other service members who rely on them.166 Second, in 
addition to casting doubt on whether gender dysphoria is, in fact, treatable 
as every major medical association has concluded,167 the administration 
argues that the treatment of gender dysphoria itself threatens safety 
because it renders people with gender dysphoria non-deployable, thereby 
inhibiting the military's capacity to fulfill its obligations.168 Lastly, the 
administration argues that the "disproportionate" costs of such treatment 
undermine military "efficiency," siphoning resources that could be better 
used elsewhere.169 
Morality also drives the exclusion of transgender service members. On 
July 26, 2017, President Donald Trump ordered the Department of Defense 
to purge the military of transgender service members, calling them a 
"burdenO" and a "disruption."170 Although the administration has 
struggled mightily to distinguish the formality of the Mattis Plan from the 
rancor of the President's tweets, animus remains a central motivation for 
the exclusion.171 Indeed, in defending the exclusion, the Administration 
165. 	See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pis.' Second Amended Complaint or Mot. for 
Summary Judgment, at 23-2, Doe v. Trump II, 315 F. Supp. 3d 474 (D.D.C. 
Apr. 20, 2018) (No. 17-cv-1597 (CKK)) (hereinafter DoeDefs.' Mot Dismiss], 
available at https://notransmilitaryban.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ 
2018-04-20-Motion-to-Dismiss-or-Motion-for-Summary-Judgment.pdf 
(https://perma.cc/6773-AGGH]. 
166. 	See id at 25 (discussing "life-and-death consequences of warfare"). 
167. 	 See Doe v. Trump II, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 483 (discussing medical community's 
"immediate" denunciation of Trump Administration's assertion that there is 
"uncertainty" regarding the efficacy of treatment for gender dysphoria). 
168. 	Doe Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, supra note 165, at 25-27. 
169. 	Id at 32-33. 
170. 	Doe v. Trump I, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 182-83. 
171. 	See Doe v. Trump II, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 494 (observing that Mattis Plan was 
"crafted over the course of months (clearly with assistance from lawyers and 
an eye to pending litigation) [and] is a longer, more nuanced expression of 
the President's policy direction than the brief, blanket assertions made by 
the President himself in 2017"). As explained by Justice Kennedy (for himself 
and Justice O'Connor), animus arises not only from "malice or hostil(ity]," 
but also from "insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational 
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has argued that transgender service members would cause "frustrat[ion ]" 
and "friction in the ranks."172 For this proposition, the administration 
suggested that there are non-transgender service members who may 
resent the application of less exacting fitness standards to transgender 
women, non-transgender women who may resent being "pitt[ed] ... 
against biological males who identify as female," and non-transgender men 
"who would like to be exempted from male uniform and grooming 
standards as a means of expressing their own sense of identity."173 
Lastly, the Administration has argued that permitting transgender 
people to serve would undermine "order, discipline, leadership, and unit 
cohesion" by "invad[ing] the expectations of privacy of ... non-transgender 
service members"-particularly with respect to "sleeping and latrine 
areas."174 These arguments mirror those repeatedly raised in the context 
of denials of appropriate single-sex services.175 
2. Constitutional Review of Exclusion for Military Service 
(a) Equal Protection 
In Doe v. Trump, the first of four cases to challenge the Trump 
administration's exclusion of transgender service members, a federal 
district court for the District of Columbia preliminarily enjoined the Trump 
Administration's transgender military ban on equal protection grounds.176 
According to the court, the exclusion of transgender people warranted "an 
intermediate level of scrutiny" for two reasons: first, because "transgender 
reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against people who 
appear to be different in some respects from ourselves." Bd. of Trs. of Univ. 
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Kennedy, J.. concurring). 
172. 	 Doe Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, supra note 165, at 30-31. 
173. 	 Id; see also Doe v. Trump!, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 212 n.10 (stating that, "[t]o 
the extent that [the administration's argument regarding unit cohesion] is a 
thinly-veiled reference to an assumption that other service members are 
biased against transgender people, this would not be a legitimate rationale 
for the challenged policy"). 
174. 	 SeeDoeDefs.' Mot. Dismiss, supra note 165, at 27-30. 
175. 	 See supra Part 11.8 and accompanying text. 
176. 	 Doe v. Trump!, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 213; see also Doe v. Trump JI, 315 F. Supp. 
3d at 498 (declining to dissolve preliminary injunction). 
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individuals ... appear to satisfy the criteria of at least a quasi-suspect 
classification" under the Supreme Court's four-factor test, and second, 
because the exclusion is "a form of discrimination on the basis of gender 
[stereotypes], which is itself subject to intermediate scrutiny."177 
Applying heightened scrutiny, the court rejected the administration's 
safety, morality, and privacy justifications. The ban did not further safety, 
or "military readiness," the court reasoned, based on a number of factors, 
including the sheer breadth of the exclusion, which "appear[ed] to be 
divorced from any transgender individual's actual ability to serve."178 
According to the court, the military ban "establishes a special addiaonal 
exclusionary rule (that] precludes individuals who would otherwise satisfy 
the demanding standards applicable to all service members simply 
because they have certain traits that are associated with being 
transgender."179 
The court also identified and rejected what appeared to be an 
"improper animus or purposeD" for the transgender military ban, based 
on the highly "unusual circumstances" surrounding its issuance.180 
177. 	Doe v. Trump!, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 209-10; see also Stockman v. Trump, 331 
F. Supp. 3d 990, 1002 (2018) (applying "intermediate scrutiny"); Karnoski v. 
Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *11 (W.D. Wash. April 13, 
2018) (holding that transgender people are "a suspect class" and applying 
"strict scrutiny"); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 768 (2017) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny, but concluding that the 2017 Memorandum was 
"unlikely to survive a rational review. The lack of any justification for the 
abrupt policy change, combined with the discriminatory impact to a group of 
our military service members who have served our country capably and 
honorably, cannot possibly constitute a legitimate governmental interest"). 
178. 	Doe v. Trump II, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 497 (emphasis added). 
179. 	Id (emphasis in original); see also id ("In the absence of the challenged 
policy, transgender individuals are subject to all of the same standards and 
requirements for accession and retention as any other service member."); 
see also Doe v. Trump!, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 179 (stating that, by 2016, "senior 
uniformed officers and senior civilian officers from each department of the 
military ... conclude[d] that ... prohibitingtransgender people from serving 
undermines military effectiveness and readiness because it excludes 
qualified individuals on a basis that has no relevance to one's fitness to 
serve, and creates unexpected vacancies requiring expensive and time­
consuming recruitment and training of replacements") (emphasis in 
original). 
180. 	Doe v. Trump!, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 213; id ("[D]epartures from the normal 
procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are 
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"[A]fter a lengthy review process by senior military personnel," the court 
observed, 
the military had recently determined that permitting transgender 
individuals to serve would not have adverse effects on the military 
and had announced that such individuals were free to serve 
openly. Many transgender service members identified themselves 
to their commanding officers in reliance on that pronouncement. 
Then, the President abruptly announced, via Twitter-without any 
. of the formality or deliberative processes that generally 
accompany the development and announcement of major policy 
changes that will gravely affect the lives of many Americans-that 
all transgender individuals would be precluded from participating 
in the military in any capacity. These circumstances provide 
additional support for Plaintiffs' claim that the decision to exclude 
transgender individuals was not driven by genuine concerns 
regarding military efficacy.181 
Given the ban's overbreadth and improper animus, the court refused 
to credit the Administration's concern that transgender people's presence 
would "erode reasonable expectations of privacy that are important in 
maintaining unit cohesion"182-dismissing the "unit cohesion" argument 
as a "thinly-veiled reference" to other service members' "biasO against 
playing a role.") (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Haus. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)); see Doe v. Trump 11, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 497 
("[B]ecause the plan fundamentally implements the policy directives set 
forth by the President in 2017, the unusual factors associated with the 
issuance of the 2017 directives are still relevant."). 
181. 	 Doe v. Trump/, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 213; see Doe v. Trump II, 315 F. Supp. 3d 
at 497 ("[T]he Court is still concerned that, immediately prior to the 
announcement of the 2017 Presidential directives, the military had studied 
the issue and found no reason to exclude transgender service members. The 
Court is likewise still concerned that the President's 2017 directives 
constituted an abrupt reversal in policy, and a revocation of rights, 
announced without any of the formality, deliberative process, or factual 
support usually associated with such a significant action.") (emphasis in 
original); see also Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 768 ("agree[ing] with 
the D.C. Court that there is sufficient support for Plaintiffs' claims that 'the 
decision to exclude transgender individuals was not driven by genuine 
concerns regarding military efficacy'"). 
182. 	 Doe Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, supra note 165, at 28. 
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transgender people," which is an "illegitimate rationale for the challenged 
policy."183 In Stockman v. Trump, the Central District of California likewise 
rejected the administration's privacy concern. "In the history of military 
service in this country," the court concluded, 
"the loss of unit cohesion" has been consistently weaponized 
against open service by a new minority group. Yet, at every turn, 
this assertion has been overcome by the military's steadfast ability 
to integrate these individuals into effective members of our armed 
forces. As with blacks, women, and gays, so now with transgender 
persons. The military has repeatedly proven its capacity to adapt 
and grow stronger specifically by the inclusion of these 
individuals. Therefore, the government cannot use "the loss of 
unit cohesion" as an excuse to prevent an otherwise qualified class 
of discrete and insular minorities from joining the armed forces. 184 
On January 4, 2019, in a per curiam decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals vacated the district court's preliminary injunction in Doe v. 
Trump, allowing the transgender military ban to go into effect temporarily 
while the case proceeded.185 "Although the Mattis Plan continues to bar 
183. 	Doe v. Trump/, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 212 n. 10. 
184. 	Stockman, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 1004; see also Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17­
1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *12 (W.D. Wash. April 13, 2018) ("[T)he 
Court notes that Defendants' claimed justifications for the Ban-to promote 
'military lethality and readiness' and avoid 'disrupt[ing] unit cohesion, or 
tax[ing] military resources'-are strikingly similar to justifications offered in 
the past to support the military's exclusion and segregation of African 
American service members, its 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy, and its policy 
preventing women from serving in combat roles."); cf. Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 
17-5267, 2017 WL 6553389, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("[I]t must be 
remembered that all Plaintiffs seek during this litigation is to serve their 
Nation with honor and dignity, volunteering to face extreme hardships, to 
endure lengthy deployments and separation from family and friends, and to 
willingly make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives if necessary to protect the 
Nation, the people of the United States, and the Constitution against all who 
would attack them."). 
185. 	See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, No. 18-5257, 2019 WL 102309, at *22 (D.C. Cir. 
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many transgender persons from joining or serving in the military," the 
court reasoned, it did not bar all transgender people-namely, those 
protected by the Mattis Plan's narrow safe harbor provision, and those 
"Owilling to serve in their biological sex."186 The court's reasoning is 
fatally misguided for two reasons. First, as the district court concluded, the 
safe harbor provision applies to only "a small group of il:1dividuals" who 
are willing to be "single[d] ... out from all other service members and 
mark[ ed] as categorically unfit for military service."187 This provision is 
also a part of effectuating a ban because, once members of that small group 
retire or otherwise conclude their service, no transgender people will be 
allowed to remain. This is hardly sufficient to salvage an irrational ban. 
Second, the court's assumption that transgender people may serve "in 
their biological sex" is premised on the fallacy that a policy that requires 
transgender people to suppress a core aspect of their identity is not a ban. 
188 As the district court concluded, requiring transgender service members 
to live "in their biological sex" is like requiring Muslim service members to 
renounce their Muslim faith. 189 In either case, it is effectively a ban on 
military service.190 
On January 22, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court likewise allowed the 
transgender military ban to go into effect in two other cases-Karnoskj v. 
Trump and Stockman v. Trump-pending disposition of the 
administration's appeals of those cases in the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.191 And on March 7, 2019, in Stone v. Trump-the fourth and last 
186. 	 Id at *2 (emphasis added). 
187. 	 Doe v. Trump II, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 486, 495 n.12. 
188. 	 Shanahan, 2019 WL 102309, at *2. 
189. 	 See Doe v. Trump II, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 494-95. 
190. 	 See id at 494 ("Tolerating a person with a certain characteristic only on the 
condition that they renounce that characteristic is the same as not tolerating 
them at all."). Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the D.C. 
Circuit also credited what it found to be "substantial steps" taken by the 
administration-after issuing the 2017 Presidential Memorandum and 
before issuing the Mattis Plan-"to cure the procedural deficiencies the 
court identified in the enjoined 2017 Presidential Memorandum." Shanahan, 
2019 WL 102309, at* 2. 
191. 	 Trump v. Karnoski, 2019 WL 271944, at *1 (2019); Trump v. Stockman, 
2019 WL 271946, at *1 (2019). In a separate order, the Supreme Court 
denied the Trump administration's extraordinary request that it hear an 
immediate appeal before judgment issues from the Ninth Circuit. See Adam 
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case to address the issue-the District of Maryland similarly allowed the 
ban to take effect pending the court's determination on the merits.192 On 
April 12, 2019, the Department of Defense began enforcing the ban.193 
(b) Substantive Due Process 
Of the four cases challenging the transgender military ban, Stone v. 
Trump addressed substantive due process most significantly. In that case, 
the District of Maryland denied the Trump administration's motion to 
dismiss on substantive due process grounds, based on the President's 
"capricious, arbitrary, and unqualified tweet of new policy" that 
"degrade[d]" and "demean[ed]" transgender people.194 According to the 
court, the President's unexpected announcement of a blanket ban on 
transgender service members, which lacked "methodical and systematic 
review by military stakeholders," could fairly be said to "shock the 
contemporary conscience."195 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION 
This Essay has described several prominent examples of government 
discrimination against transgender people, the tropes advanced by the 
government in support of such discrimination, and the failure of those 
tropes to persuade the courts. We now consider some of the broader 
implications of courts' rejection of transgender tropes as a basis for 
government decision-making. 
Liptak, Supreme Court Revives Transgender Ban for Military Service, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/us/politics/ 
transgender-ban-military-supreme-courthtml [https://perma.cc/5WPJ­
MRRX). 
192. 	 Order at 6, Stone v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02459-GLR (Mar. 7, 2019), available 
at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5763942-Stone-order-stayi 
ng-injunction.html [https://perma.ccjYA9Z-49HM]. 
193. 	 Trump Administration Begins Enforcing Its Transgender Military Ban Amid 
Ongoing Legal Challenges, GLAD (April 12, 2019), https://www.glad.org/ 
post/trump-administration-begins-enforcing-its-transgender-military-ban­
amid-ongoing-legal-challenges [https://perma.cc/F9SG-8HLH). 
194. 	Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 770-71 (D. Md. 2017) (citing United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013)). 
195. 	Id at 771. 
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A. Legal 
First consider the obvious legal implications. By refusing to credit 
government officials' assertions that transgender people are threatening, 
immoral, and disrespectful of gender norms, lower courts have recognized 
the rights of transgender people to access a range of public spaces, 
benefits, and services previously denied to them. Lawmakers' efforts to 
criminalize transgender people's existence, and laws and policies that 
deny transgender people appropriate access to sex-differentiated services, 
exclude them from anti-discrimination protection, or ban them from 
military service are rightfully viewed with skepticism.196 Transgender 
people, once "ignored [and] excluded" on the basis of outdated, inaccurate 
assumptions, are demanding and securing the right to be fully integrated 
into the American mainstream.197 
B. Doctrinal 
Courts' recognition of transgender rights also has implications for 
constitutional doctrine, namely equal protection and substantive due 
process. Over the past two decades, lower courts reviewing transgender 
classifications have broadened the scope of the Equal Protection Clause in 
two significant ways. First, courts have expanded the application of 
heightened scrutiny by holding that transgender status is, itself, a 
suspect/quasi-suspect class and, alternatively, that discrimination against 
transgender people is a form of sex discrimination subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.198 Second, when reviewing transgender classifications under the 
more deferential rational basis test, courts have engaged in a searching 
review, scrutinizing the record for evidence of animus against transgender 
people. Substantive due process doctrine has likewise evolved, with lower 
courts acknowledging transgender people's fundamental right to liberty, 
privacy, and autonomy-the right to manifest and live consistent with a 
196. 	 See supra Part II (discussing invalidation of laws and policies that 
discriminate against transgender people). 
197. 	 For an excellent summary of the progress of transgender rights in recent 
decades, see Kylar W. Broadus & Shannon Price Minter, Legal Issues, jn 
TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY ch. 10 
(Laura Erickson-Schroth ed., 2014). 
198. 	 See supra Part II (discussing equal protection cases). 
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core feature of their identity without fear of stigmatization or bodily 
harm. 199 
C. Theoretical 
Courts' recognition of transgender rights likewise informs normative 
theories of government responsibility. We briefly discuss three such 
theories here. Natural law theory, which is dedicated to the promotion of 
"moral" behavior based on conceptions of what is "natural," has long 
fueled the trope that transgender people are immoral.200 Although 
trumpeted by defenders of gender-norming criminal laws in the mid­
twentieth century and by members of Congress who voted to exclude 
transgender people from the ADA in 1990, natural law defenses for the 
disparate treatment of transgender people have lost currency in the 
courts.201 Indeed, public officials often go- out of their way to avoid 
invoking moral opposition toward transgender people as a basis for 
decision-making, opting instead for less morally charged rhetoric, such as 
"unit cohesion" in the military context, and "personal privacy" in the 
education context.202 
Utilitarian theory, which, generally speaking, seeks "the greatest good 
for the greatest number,"203 has played contradictory roles in the debate 
over whether the Constitution permits laws that criminalize gender 
nonconformance, deny access to appropriate single-sex services, or 
exclude transgender people from anti-discrimination protections and the 
military. Invoking tropes that transgender people are a threat to public 
safety and privacy, public officials argue that the challenged laws are a 
199. 	See supra Part II (discussing substantive due process cases). 
200. 	 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 15, at 349-50 (stating that natural law "posits 
humans' natural or universal needs or constitution and argues for certain 
basicgoods that best meet those needs or fit that constitution"). 
201. 	 See supra Part II (discussing courts' rejection of moral justifications for 
transgender discrimination). 
202. 	 See supra Part Il.C-0 (discussing government justifications for transgender 
discrimination in the military and in schools). 
203. 	 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 15, at 365; see also Adam M. Samaha, What Good 
is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1251, 1292 (2007) 
(discussing utilitarianism). 
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proper utilitarian response to the purported harm.204 Rejecting as 
baseless the argument that transgender people threaten public safety or 
privacy, transgender litigants argue that the challenged laws violate 
utilitarian principles by harming a minority of people without any 
corresponding benefit to the majority.205 As with natural law arguments 
depicting transgender people as immoral, governments' utilitarian 
arguments depicting transgender people as a threat to public safety and 
privacy have consistently failed, with courts demanding evidence of 
predatory behavior or the imperiling of private interests-and finding 
none.206 
A third theory, little mentioned in the constitutional or gender and 
sexuality literature, is disability theory's "social model of disability."207 
This theory, which emerged from the disability rights movement of the 
1970's, posits that the concept of disability is socially constructed and 
contingent.208 No one's body "works perfectly, or consistently, or 
204. 	 See supra Part II (discussing public safety and privacy justifications for 
transgender discrimination); cf. William E. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: 
The Sedimentation ofAntigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect ofjudicial 
Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1373 (2000) (discussing utilitarian defense 
of anti-LGB laws). 
205. 	 See supra Part II (discussing transgender litigants' challenges to 
discriminatory laws); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 15, at 366 
( di.scussing utilitarian argument against state regulation that "imposes harm 
upon a minority without corresponding benefit for the majority"); accord 
NUSSBAUM, supra note 9, at 56, 123. 
206. 	 See supra Part II (discussing courts' rejection of public safety and privacy 
justifications for transgender discrimination). 
207. 	 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 15, at 108-17 (discussing concerns with 
the purported "medicalization" of transgender identity but not addressing 
the subordination of people with gender dysphoria and the social model of 
disability that informs disability rights laws); accord KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, 
GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW 7-8, 106 (2016). 
208. 	 See MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT 10-11 (1990) (advancing a 
"social (oppression) theory of disability," which holds that "[d]isability [is] 
the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social 
organisation which takes no or little account of people who have physical [or 
mental] impairments and thus excludes them from the mainstream of social 
activities"); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and 
Disability, 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, 428-29 (2000) ("The social model ... treats 
disability as the interaction between societal barriers (both physical and 
otherwise) and the impairment: 'From this perspective, disability is 
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eternally," the model holds; we all have health conditions that exist on a 
spectrum, ranging from those that significantly restrict how our bodies 
function to those that impose no such restrictions.209 According to the 
social model of disability, people are "disabled" not by the functional 
limitations imposed by their health conditions, but rather by prejudice, 
stereotypes (both conscious and unconscious), and indifference toward 
those conditions.210 Simply put, disability lies not with the individual, but 
rather with society's negative treatment of the individual.211 Under this 
attributed primarily to a disabling environment instead of bodily defects or 
deficiencies."') (citation omitted). 
209. 	 Tom Shakespeare & Nicholas Watson, The Social Model of Disability: An 
Outdated Ideology?, in 2 Research in Social Science and Disability 24 (Sharon 
N. Barnartt & Barbara M. Altman eds., 2001); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., 
Substantially Limited Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special 
Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 
VILL. L. REV. 409, 519 (1997) ("(T]here are spectrums of physical and mental 
abilities that range from superlative to minimal or nonfunctional." (quoting 
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL 
ABILITIES 87 (1983))). 
210. 	See Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender 
People Through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 74-92 (Paisley 
Currah et al. eds., 2006) ("[B]arriers to full equality faced by persons with a 
wide range of health conditions [a]re caused not so much by physical 
attributes as by the prejudice and attitudinal barriers they experienceff'); 
see also Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
621, 654 (1999) ("[T]he disadvantaged status of persons with disabilities is 
the product of a hostile (or at least inhospitable) social environment, not 
simply the product of bodily defects."). 
211. 	See Kevin Barry, Towards Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008 Can and Can't Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 
211-12 (2010) ("What distinguishes us, and what makes some of us 
'disabled' and others not, is not whether our medical impairments limit our 
bodily functions, but rather whether our society limits us based on 
those impairments."); see also H.R. REP. No.101-485(11), at 41 (May 15, 
1990) (House Comm. on Educ. & Lab) ("The social consequences that have 
attached to being disabled often bear no relationship to the physical or 
mental limitations irriposed by the disability. For example, being paralyzed 
has meant far more than being unable to walk-it has meant being excluded 
from public schools, being denied employment opportunities, and being 
deemed an 'unfit parent."') (quoting testimony of Arlene Mayerson of the 
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund). 
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model, disability is a civil rights issue, and society's proper response is to 
remedy the disadvantage of those whom society has "disabled."212 
The social model of disability figures prominently in cases challenging 
the constitutionality of transgender discrimination. Laws that discriminate 
against transgender people often target gender transition, which is the 
recognized treatment for gender dysphoria. 213 Accordingly, laws that 
criminalize or otherwise disadvantage those who undergo transition are 
necessarily "disabling"; they subject people with gender dysphoria to a 
host of exclusions and indignities.214 Society's appropriate response, 
transgender litigants argue, is for courts to remedy disability 
discrimination by invalidating such laws under the Constitution.215 
Significantly, lower courts have agreed, striking down a range of laws and 
policies that have criminalized or otherwis.e thwarted the prescribed 
treatment and well-being of people with gender dysphoria "in direct 
contravention of medical and psychological indications."216 
212. 	 See Bagenstos, supra note 208, at 426, 430. 
213. 	 See WORLD PROF. Ass'N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE 
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 9­
10 (7th ed. 2011), https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/Web%2 
OTransfer/SOC/Standards%2 Oqf%20Care%2 OV7%2 0-%202011%20WPAT 
H.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY67-TZUT]. 
214. 	 See Levi & Klein, supra note 210, at 80 (stating that "transgender people 
who face discrimination because of being transgender may bring a claim" 
under disability rights laws because "they have a physical or mental health 
condition or because they experience discrimination based on the 
perception that they do"); see also DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF. FUND, Health 
Disparities at the Intersection of Disability and Gender Identity, 
https://dredf.org/health-disparities-at-the-intersection-of-disability-and­
gender-identity [https://perma.cc/683Y-Y5YX] (stating that "transgender 
people with disabilities" disproportionately face health-specific barriers, 
including "discrimination in the health care and social service setting"). 
215. 	 See, e.g., Doe v. Mass. Dep't of Corr.,Correction, No. 17-12255122555-RGS, 
2018 WL 2994403, at *6-8 (D. Mass. 2018); Doe Iv. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 
79 (S.D. Tex. 1980) 
216. 	 McConn, 489 F. Supp. at 79; see also Mass. Dep'tofCorr., 2018 WL 2994403, 
at *8 ("[T]he DOC's biological sex-based assignment policy has a disparate 
impact on inmates with GD because it injects them into a prison 
environment that is contrary to a critical aspect of their prescribed 
treatment (that they be allowed to live as, in Doe's case, a woman)."). 
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D. Symbolic 
Lastly, courts' recognition of the rights of transgender people under 
the Constitution has implications beyond the law. The Constitution serves 
an important expressive function, particularly for those who are 
marginalized.217 Its conferral of rights is, as Patricia Williams has written, 
"symbolic of all the denied aspects of humanity: rights imply a respect 
which places one within the referential range of self and others, which 
elevates one's status from human body to social being."218 The attainment 
of constitutional rights, then, does more than empower transgender 
people to contest government discrimination; as Kylar Broadus, a 
transgender advocate and attorney, has thoughtfully written, these rights 
allow transgender people "to envision [them]selves, and to be seen by 
others, as fully human."219 
217. 	 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 9, at xxi (discussing constitutional law's 
"profound[] relevan[ce] for the politics of humanity" and the struggle of 
subordinated people "to find respect and understanding"). 
218. 	 Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing ideals from 
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 416 (1987). 
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